The Economic Forces Behind Deindustrialization: An Empirical Investigation by Van Neuss, Leif
1 
 
The Economic Forces behind Deindustrialization: An Empirical 
Investigation1 
 
Leif van Neuss2 
HEC - University of Liège 
 
August 2, 2016 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an in-depth study of deindustrialization and to systematically analyze the 
reasons why the world’s most economically successful countries have experienced a sharp decline in relative 
manufacturing employment over the last decades. A large strand of empirical literature on deindustrialization 
aims at quantifying the relative importance of the economic forces behind deindustrialization, especially of the 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors. While this study does not contradict the widespread belief that internal factors 
are quantitatively more important in explaining deindustrialization in advanced countries taken as a whole, our 
results, based on both static and dynamic techniques and panel data on 18 OECD countries from 1977 to 2007, 
however suggest that the role of globalization may be revised upwards when resorting to appropriate and well-
defined indicators of trade in manufactures.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Following seminal contributions by scholars like Fisher (1939), Clark (1940) and Fourastié (1949) in the 
first half of the 20th century, structural transformation or structural change, usually defined as the 
reallocation of economic activity across the three broad sectors agriculture, manufacturing and 
services3, has been the object of growing interest in the literature over the last few decades. In his 
Nobel Prize lecture, Kuznets (1973) even referred to structural change, a phenomenon characterized, 
among others, by the massive reallocation of labor out of agriculture, as one of the six main features 
of modern economic growth, with the latter being described as the sustained rise in productivity and 
living standards (Herrendorf et al., 2014). The surge of interest in structural change has relied in part 
on the social and economic fears associated with the process of deindustrialization, broadly defined as 
the secular decline in the share of manufacturing in total economy, which has particularly affected the 
most advanced countries since the last third of the 20th century4. By way of illustration, the share of 
manufacturing in total nominal value added and employment dropped respectively from 26.6% to 
18.1% and from 28.2% to 15.6% in the EU155 between 1970 and 2007. Over the same period, the value 
added and employment shares of manufacturing went respectively from 23.5% to 13.1% and from 
22.4% to 9.9% in the US6. In 2014, the value added share of manufacturing in the EU15 and the US is 
estimated to amount 15.1% and 12.1% respectively, while the employment share is equal to 13.2% 
and 8.1% respectively 7. 
 
The term deindustrialization definitively fell into current language with the publication of Bluestone 
and Harrison’s (1982) famous and seminal book entitled The Deindustrialisation of America. Defining 
“deindustrialization” as the “widespread and systematic disinvestment in a nation’s basic productive 
capacity” (1982:6), the authors expressed great concern about the wave of plant closings that swept 
through the northern US during the 1970s and the ongoing erosion of the America’s industrial base, a 
phenomenon supposedly caused in part by a “globalization gambit” linking international capital flows 
and industrial investment decisions with both local and personal troubles8 (Strangleman and Rhodes, 
                                                          
3 As pointed out by Stijepic (2011:3), the main reason why this three-sector division has been so widely used is because “it 
seems to be useful to explain the historical development of the industrialized economies, i.e. the transition from agriculture 
to manufacturing and from manufacturing to services”. 
4 As evidenced by Palma (2014:8-9), advanced OECD countries began deindustrializing in the late 1960s, while some high-
income developing countries in East Asia entered this phase in the late 1980s. More surprisingly, Latin America and Africa 
have also gone through a process of deindustrialization since the 1980s and the implementation of some radical economic 
reforms. This has been especially marked in Latin American where the share of manufacturing in total value added dropped 
from 24% to 18% on average between 1980 and 2005 (Szirmai, 2012). This process of deindustrialization in Latin America and 
Africa has taken place at levels of economic development, measured by means of income per capita, being far lower than 
those of the advanced OECD countries that began deindustrializing earlier, a situation soemtimes labelled “premature 
deindustrialization”, whose potential harmful economic consequences have been emphasized by a lerge number of scholars 
(see e.g. Szirmai, 2012; Imbs, 2013; Rodrick, 2015). 
5 The term EU15 refers to the 15 Member States of the European Union as of December 31, 2003, prior to the accession of 
ten candidate countries on 1 May 2004 (OECD). It comprises the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
6 The data is from the EU KLEMS Database. 
7 The data for the EU15 is from Eurostat. The data for the US is from BEA (value added) and BLS (employment). 
8 Bluestone and Harrison’s (1982) broader account of America’s deindustrialization includes elements like declining profits, 
anti-union management, the avoidance of taxation and welfare responsibilities, and shifting power relations between capital 
and labor (Brady and Denniston, 2006) 
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2014, Strangleman 2016a). Although the phrase “deindustrialization” is nowadays commonly used to 
refer to the relative decline of manufacturing at national level, a process that dates back to the late 
1960s in the advanced OECD countries, it has also been increasingly resorted to by the literature to 
describe situations of industrial decline and economic downturn at more disaggregated geographical 
levels, notably at regional and city level, throughout economic history. By way of illustration, Verley 
(1997:79) employs the term “deindustrialization” to characterize the decline of the urban industry, and 
the attendant growth of commercial and financial activities, in many European cities following the 
development of protoindustrialization and the putting-out system, a specific mixed form of labor 
organization which combines rural and urban aspects, that preceded the industrial revolution9. In the 
same book, Verley (1997:420) also employs the term “deindustrialization” to describe the economic 
decline of some European proto-industrial regions, notably in France and Britain, which failed their 
transition to modern industry at times of the industrial revolution10. The term “deindustrialization” has 
also been largely used to refer to regions that industrialized over the 19th and 20th century based on 
some comparative advantage, like the presence of economically valuable natural resources (coal, iron, 
etc.), and finally experienced a decline in the performance of their traditional sectors because of some 
competitiveness loss that could result, for instance, from the emergence of a new “technical system”, 
as it was called by Gille (1978), or growing trade (see e.g. Byrne, 1980; Taylor, 1981; Lissoni, 1996; 
Koistinen, 2006; Minchin, 2006;; McKee, 2008; Dandaneau, 2012; Barton, 2015).  
 
The study of deindustrialization, understood as the relative decline in the share of manufacturing in 
total national employment and output, really took off in the 1980s as the scale and consequences of 
economic restructuring and job losses in manufacturing became much more apparent and tangible, 
especially in the United Kingdom and the US, thus contradicting Lawrence’s (1983) early claim that 
deindustrialization was a myth (Strangleman and Rhodes, 2014). As recently stressed by High (2013), 
the scholarly focus on deindustrialization, whose multidimensional and interdisciplinary aspect has 
been repeatedly stressed in the scientific literature (see e.g. Pahl, 1984; Newman, 1985; Goch, 2002; 
Altena and Van der Linden, 2002, Cowie and Heathcott, 2003; Strangleman, 2016a and 2016b), has 
broadened from the causes of deindustrialization to its short and long term effects. While sociology 
has largely addressed the “social trauma” (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982:65) supposedly caused by 
relative manufacturing decline, notably through various studies analyzing the consequences of mass 
shutdowns upon workers and their families, as well as upon local communities, economics has rather 
devoted a great deal of effort to investigating the potential effects of relative manufacturing decline 
on employment, growth or income inequality.  
 
What are the key economic forces behind deindustrialization? Although this research question calls 
for specific considerations, it is actually part of a larger discussion on the drivers of structural change. 
The theoretical literature has thus identified various channels through which structural change, and 
deindustrialization, can occur. They range from demand-side factors (see e.g. Clark, 1940; Kongsamut 
                                                          
9 The theory of proto-industrialization, first developed by Mendels (1972), was an attempt to associate the movement of rural 
industrialization observed in Western Europe in the 18th century with the creation of the “modern” industry. 
10 Verley (1997) puts forward different factors likely to account for these industrial failures. They include, among others, the 
disruption of trade flows, the loss of position revenues due to expanding geographical markets as a result of, for instance, 
better transport infrastructure, the lack of industrial motivation from local capital owners, the excessive energy cost, like the 
coal-supply cost, in a context of rising dependence of industrial activities on steam power. 
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et al., 2001; Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2008) to technological factors (see e.g. Baumol, 1967; Baumol et 
al., 1985; Ngai and Pissarides, 2007; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2015), and 
also include elements about the inter-sectoral division of labor (outsourcing) and international trade11. 
Despite the growing literature devoted to structural change, the causes of deindustrialization are 
however still not fully understood. In particular, the relative importance of the driving forces at work 
through the potential channels identified by the theoretical literature, especially of the internal and 
external factors, is not well established. This is partly because most previous empirical research on 
deindustrialization (see e.g. Wood, 1994, 1995; Saeger, 1997; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997, 1999; 
Alderson, 1997, 1999; Kucera and Milberg, 2003; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004; Whitford, 2005; Brady 
and Denniston, 2006; Kollmeyer, 2009; Kang and Lee, 2011; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004, 2013; Rodrik, 
2015) has either ignored one or more of the explanations of deindustrialization altogether or has 
simply failed to test all of them simultaneously. In addition to this potential omitted variable bias, 
which has already been stressed by Kollmeyer (2009), we argue that the common measure of trade as 
a factor likely to account for deindustrialization in previous studies is inaccurate and may lead to 
misleading results.      
 
Based on an up-to-date review of the literature on structural change, the main purpose of this study is 
to discuss some issues of debate regarding deindustrialization and to analyze the determinants of 
deindustrialization using a dataset covering the world’s most economically successful countries over 
the period going from 1977 to 200712. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows evidence of 
relative manufacturing decline in the world’s most economically successful countries since the 1970s. 
Section 3 provides an overview of the main factors advanced in the scientific literature to account for 
deindustrialization. Section 4 describes the data and the research strategy used to test the factors 
associated with deindustrialization. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses the 
potential implications and consequences of deindustrialization. Section 7 gives concluding remarks.   
 
2. Deindustrialization: evidence for currently rich countries 
 
In their course of economic development, virtually all advanced countries have followed a broadly 
similar trajectory (Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004, 2013). Up until the 18th century, agriculture was the 
most important sector in all national economies around the globe, absorbing most of the labor force 
and contributing most of the production. Its importance was emphasized by some highly influential 
economists like François Quesnay who considered agriculture as the only productive sector able to 
generate profits, relegating the other activities like manufacturing and trade, viewed as “sterile”, to 
the sidelines (Kongsamut et al., 1997, 2001). As from the second half of the 18th century, a number of 
                                                          
11 A strand of the literature on structural change, and especially of the literature on deindustrialization, has been used to 
dividing the factors potentially responsible for structural change into two groups: internal and external factors. The external 
factors mainly relate to international trade. 
12 Though internationally comparable data on economic structure in the world’s most advanced economies are available up 
to 2011 in the EU Klems database and the OECD STAN database, we decided to restrict the period of investigation in order to 
exclude from the analysis the recent financial and economic crisis that swept across the world following the subprime 
mortgage crisis in 2007 and dramatically affected manufacturing, with potentially large effects on economic structure data.   
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countries, especially those that are nowadays viewed as the most economically successful countries, 
have experienced a successful wave of industrialization. According to traditional historiography, the 
industrial revolution began in Britain then swept through Europe and North America, before reaching 
Japan and Russia by the end of the 19th century. While the causes of the industrial revolution are still 
heatedly debated in the literature (see e.g. Mokyr, 1999; van Neuss, 2015), it is nevertheless widely 
recognized that the industrial revolution, a period that witnessed an unprecedented irise in the rates 
of efficiency advance (Clark, 2014), marked the starting point of modern economic growth, defined as 
the sustainable increase in GDP per capita, and accelerated the process of structural change. The 
growth of GDP per capita in successful countries has been accompanied with a fall in the agricultural 
share of employment and output, and a rise in the share of services. Manufacturing has moved on a 
different trajectory as its share in national output and employment follows a hump shape, that is, it is 
increasing for lower levels of economic development and decreasing for higher levels of economic 
development (see e.g. Buera and Kaboski, 2012a, 2012b; Herrendorf et al., 2014; van Neuss, 2016). 
The decreasing part of this trajectory refers to the process of “deindustrialization”, a phenomenon 
which has particularly affected the most advanced economies since the last third of the 20th century.  
As shown in figures 1 and 2, the share of manufacturing in total employment and total nominal value 
added has declined in all selected advanced countries since 197013. For instance, the manufacturing 
share of total employment in the EU15 (US) dropped from 28.2% (22.4%) to 15.6% (9.9%) between 
1970 and 2007. Over the same period, the share of manufacturing in total nominal value added in the 
EU15 (US) fell from 26.6% (23.5%) to 18.1% (13.1%). As shown in appendix 1, the UK seems to be the 
country in which manufacturing experienced the sharpest decline. The share of manufacturing in total 
employment and output indeed dropped respectively from 33.2% to 11.8% (-21.4%) and from 34.2% 
to 12.4% (-21.7%)14.   
 
Figure 1: Manufacturing share of total employment, 1970-2007 
 
              Source: EU Klems Database 
                                                          
13 The selection of industrial countries was driven by the availability of data in the EU Klems database. 
14 The UK ranks only second in the table computing the absolute variation in the output share of manufacturing between 
1970 and 2007, just behind Luxembourg where the share of manufacturing in total vnominal alue added fell from 41.1% to 
8.6% (-32.5%), largely because of the growth of financial services.  
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Figure 2: Manufacturing share of total nominal value added, 1970-2007 
 
            Source: EU Klems Database 
 
While figures 1 and 2 spotlight deindustrialization in advanced countries over the few last decades, it 
remains to be seen whether the decline in the share of manufacturing in total economy has resulted 
from an absolute drop in manufacturing employment and value added or has just translated a slower 
growth of manufacturing compared to the rest of the economy. 
 
Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Value Added and Employment, 1970-2007 
 
 Value Added Employment 
 Total Economy Manufacturing Total Economy Manufacturing 
EU15 2,5% 1,9% 0,6% -1,0% 
United States 2,9% 2,8% 1,6% -0,7% 
Australia 3,3% 1,5% 1,7% -0,9% 
Japan 3,2% 3,9% 0,5% -0,6%           
          Source: EU Klems Database 
 
Table 1 reveals that manufacturing value added grew at a positive rate between 1970 and 2007 in all 
selected countries. While the average annual growth rate of value added in the manufacturing sector 
is lower than the one in the whole economy in the EU15, the US and Australia, it is remarkably higher 
in Japan, thus reflecting the important role of prices in the observed decline in the manufacturing share 
of nominal value added over the last decades (see figure 2). Manufacturing employment, by contrast, 
decreased in absolute terms between 1970 and 2007 in all selected countries. The EU15, where the 
number of manufacturing workers fell by around 1% per year on average, exhibits the largest decline, 
surpassing japan and the US. As shown in appendix 2, this figure however masks some heterogeneity 
among European countries. While the number of manufacturing workers fell by around 0.2 per year 
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on average in Italy over the period 1970-2007, it dropped by respectively 1.8% and 2.5% in Belgium 
and the UK. Accordingly, manufacturing employment was slashed by roughly half in Belgium (-48.4%) 
and more than halved in the UK (-60.7%). Ireland and Spain are the two only Member States where 
the number of manufacturing workers actually rose between 1970 and 2007, by respectively 23.1% 
and 11.7%. It is, however, noteworthy that direct international comparisons of economic activity in 
the manufacturing sector may be somewhat hazardous, especially as the different countries did not 
begin deindustrializing at the same time (see Alderson, 1999). As shown in appendix 3, the process of 
deindustrialization, which can describe a wide range of national experiences (Tregenna, 2015), has not 
been stable over time in selected countries. For instance, employment in US manufacturing, despite a 
sustained growth of manufacturing value added between 1970 and 2000, was approximatively the 
same in 2000 as in the 1970s, then started declining in the 2000s, mirroring to some extent the growth 
deceleration in manufacturing output. Between 2000 and 2007, the number of workers indeed fell by 
nearly one-quarter in the US manufacturing sector, while value added grew by only 11.7%. In Japan, 
manufacturing employment has been on a downtrend since the 1990s. Broadly speaking, it is possible 
to conclude that Europe, Australia, Japan and the US have all experienced relative deindustrialization, 
defined as a decline in the share of manufacturing in total employment and nominal value added, since 
1970. While real value added in manufacturing has followed an upward trend with cyclical ups and 
downs, and truly some growth deceleration in several countries, over the last decades, manufacturing 
employment, by contrast, is now declining in virtually all advanced countries. 
 
3. Existing explanations for deindustrialization 
 
The economic literature has identified a range of channels through which structural change, and so 
deindustrialization, may occur15. In particular, it highlights four primary sources of deindustrialization, 
namely non homothetic preferences, cross-sector differences in technology, inter-sectoral division of 
labor (outsourcing) and trade. It is important to note that all these sources are not seen as mutually 
exclusive but complementary. As this study first seeks to analyze and quantify the economic forces 
behind the decline in the manufacturing share of total employment in advanced countries, this review 
will mainly focus on the effects of the potential driving factors on manufacturing employment. 
 
Non-homothetic Preferences (Income Effects) 
 
Economists have long recognized the association between the level of economic development and the 
sectoral structure of national employment. Based on an extrapolation of Engel’s law, which states that 
the share of expenditures devoted to food products declines as per capita income rises, Clark (1940, 
1957) even predicted deindustrialization before it became a common phenomenon in rich countries 
(Saeger, 1997). Through a statistical analysis of cross-national data, Clark (1957) argues that the share 
of income spent on manufactures should rise during the first stages of economic development then 
stabilize and eventually fall beyond a certain threshold of per capita income, a situation sometimes 
                                                          
15 For general surveys of the literature on structural change, see e.g. Matsuyama (2008), Ray (2010), Herrendorf et al. (2014) 
and van Neuss (2016). 
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labelled as the “Bell’s (1976) Law” (see Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004, 2013). According to this view, 
structural change, and so deindustrialization, are driven by changes in the patterns of final demand 
resulting from changes in income. In technical terms, structural change is driven by non-homothetic 
preferences, like the well-known Stone-Geary preferences, generating non-linear Engel curves. Over 
the course of economic development, economic activity would then be reallocated towards the sectors 
providing products that respond to higher hierarchical needs. Under the assumption that productivity 
(TFP) growth is the same across the three broad sectors agriculture, manufacturing and services, the 
sequence of changes in the composition of final demand theoretically induces a curvilinear, inverted 
U-shaped relationship between income per capita and the manufacturing share of total employment. 
This account of structural change has been rigorously formalized within growth frameworks by authors 
like Kongsamut et al. (2001) or Foellmi and Zweimüller (2008). Providing strong micro-foundations for 
the use of non-homothetic preferences, Foellmi and Zweimüller (2008) thus developed a multi-sector 
growth model - in which new goods are continuously introduced into an original hierarchical utility 
function - which shows ability to reproduce the hump-shaped relationship between the manufacturing 
share of total employment and income, a trajectory observed in the data and confirmed by empirical 
research (see e.g. Rowthorn and Wells 1987; Krugman and Lawrence 1993; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 
1997, 1999; Alderson 1999; Rowthorn and Coutts 2004, 2013; Kollmeyer, 2009; Kang and Lee, 2011; 
Rodrik, 2015). Figure 3 plots individual time series of manufacturing employment share for a panel of 
20 advanced countries over the period 1970-2007. The horizontal axis measures the log of GDP per 
capita in 1990 international dollars as reported by Maddison (2013). Taken as a whole, the data appear 
to be consistent with a hump shape for the employment share in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Figure 3: Manufacturing Share of Total Employment, 20 OECD countries, 1970-2007 
 
                      Source: EU Klems Database, STAN Database (OECD), Maddison-Project (2013 version)16 
                                                          
16 Data on manufacturing employment share for Canada, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland are from the STAN Database. 
For the other countries, data on manufacturing employment share are from the EU Klems Database. 
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Cross-Sector differences in Technology (Relative Price Effects) 
 
Technological heterogeneity across sectors has also long been identified as one potential driver of 
structural change and so deindustrialization17. In his pioneer work, Baumol (1967) early formulated the 
‘cost disease’ hypothesis according to which economic resources, especially labor, would move from 
the ‘dynamic’ or ‘progressive’ sectors, those exhibiting a relatively high rate of technological progress 
(productivity growth), to the ‘stagnant’ or ‘nonprogressive’ sectors. Under the assumption that wages 
grow equally fast in all sectors (perfect mobility of labor), the unit production costs and prices increase 
relatively faster in the less dynamic sectors (Hartwig, 2015). In an influential paper, Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007) generalize Baumol’s theory and provide it with stronger foundations. In particular, they derive 
the conditions under which unequal (exogenous) sectoral TFP growth rates can generate structural 
change along a balanced growth path in a multi-sector model of growth with homothetic preferences 
and two production factors, namely labor and capital. They notably find that structural change requires 
an elasticity of substitution across consumption sectors being different from one. Along the balanced 
growth path, labor gradually moves to the consumption sectors with a relatively low TFP growth rate 
provided that the elasticity of substitution between the consumption sectors is small, i.e. lesser than 
one. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, labor then progressively moves to the sectors 
characterized by a relatively high TFP growth rate18. In Ngai and Pissarides’ model, structural change 
occurs as a consequence of relative price effects driven by heterogeneous sectoral productivity growth 
rates19. Using the EU Klems database, which provides data on employment and nominal and real value 
added for most European countries and some non-European countries, thus allowing the computation 
of both a labor productivity index and a price index (deflator), table 2 shows information on the growth 
of labor productivity and prices in manufacturing and services in a selected set of advanced countries 
over the period 1970-2007. It is noteworthy that the indicator used to measure employment is ‘total 
hours worked’, and not ‘total workers’ as in most previous research, which dramatically improves the 
accuracy of the measure of labor productivity growth. 
 
Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rate of Labor Productivity and Prices, 1970-2007 
 
 Labor Productivity Prices 
 Manufacturing Services Differential Manufacturing Services Differential 
EU15 3,3% 1,5% 1,7% 2,2% 2,9% -0,7% 
United States 3,5% 1,0% 2,5% 2,6% 4,5% -1,8% 
Australia 2,4% 1,3% 1,1% 5,4% 6,1% -0,8% 
Japan 4,9% 2,7% 2,2% 0,2% 2,6% -2,4% 
 
    Source: EU Klems Database 
                                                          
17 As stressed by Stijepic (2011:14) the reason why technological differences exist across sectors is because the nature of the 
final product differs across sectors strongly. “Therefore, the (physical) production processes, the resources which are used in 
production, the sectoral market-structures, the degree of technology-spillovers from other sectors/industries as well as 
transfer-process of the final-product to the consumer differ across sectors strongly. In general, these differences affect the 
scope for technological innovation, rationalization (substitution of labor by capital) and division of labor for a given level of 
technological development.”   
18 In case the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, the employment shares remain constant, as well as the nominal 
consumption expenditure and value added shares. 
19 Also focusing on the supply side, other scholars have shown that it is possible to have changes in relative prices, which is 
the trigger mechanism of structural change in the presence of homothetic preferences, even if technical progress is neutral 
across sectors (see e.g. Caselli and Coleman, 2001; Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008). 
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The results of table 2 are consistent with the conditions needed in Ngai and Pissarides’ model for labor 
to move away from the manufacturing sector into services when the elasticity of substitution between 
manufactures and services is relatively low. The average annual growth rate of labor productivity over 
the period 1970- 2007 is indeed higher in manufacturing than in services in the EU15, Australia, Japan 
and the US, a situation also likely to explain the drop in the relative price of manufactures. As shown 
in appendix 4, labor productivity has risen faster in the manufacturing sector than in services in virtually 
all countries, with the exception of Luxembourg where the growth of labor productivity in services was 
spurred by the development of the financial activities. In parallel, the relative price of manufactures 
has decreased in virtually all countries, with the exceptions of Norway and Portugal. These exceptions 
suggest that the growth differential in productivity between manufacturing and services is not the only 
driver of the relative price of manufactures, although it is a key determinant as shown in figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Scattergram Showing the Relationship between the Differential in the Average Annual 
Growth Rate of Labor Productivity between Manufacturing and Services (Horizontal axis) and          
the Differential in the Average Annual Growth Rate of Prices between Manufacturing and         
Services (Vertical Axis), 20 OECD countries, 1970-2007     
 
           Source: EU Klems Database, STAN Database (OECD)20 
 
The horizontal axis measures the differential in the average annual growth rate of labor productivity 
between manufacturing and services in a selected set of OECD countries over the period 1970-2007. 
The vertical axis is the differential in the average annual growth rate of prices between manufacturing 
and services. While figure 4 confirms that faster labor productivity growth in manufacturing has been 
associated with a decline in the relative price of manufactured goods in most advanced countries, it 
also spotlights a strong negative correlation, at a country level, between the differential in the average 
annual growth rate of labor productivity between manufacturing and services and the relative price 
inflation of manufactures. 
                                                          
20 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
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 The technological or supply-side argument, which links the process of deindustrialization with rapid 
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, has been largely supported by empirical studies (see 
e.g. Kravis et al., 1983; Baumol, Blackman, and Wolff 1985, 1989; Rowthorn and Wells 1987; Lawrence, 
1991; Krugman and Lawrence 1993; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1997, 1999; Rowthorn and Coutts, 
2004, 2013; Ngai and Pissarides, 2004, 2007; Nickell et al., 2008; Kollmeyer, 2009; Kang and Lee, 2011; 
Tregenna, 2013, 2015; Cruz, 2015)21. While figure 5 confirms that the fall in the manufacturing share 
of national employment has occurred along with faster labor productivity growth in manufacturing n 
virtually all selected countries, it is not clear whether larger productivity growth differential between 
manufacturing and services has led to more deindustrialization in cross-section of countries. The latter 
result, which may truly appear surprising at first glance, is potentially because the relation depicted in 
figure 5 fails to take into account the other drivers of structural change like economic maturity and 
international trade. With respect to trade, figure 5 seemingly gives support to Matsuyama’s (2009) 
view that considering the global perspective of structural change, and modelling the interdependence 
across countries, are essential to understand why faster technological progress in manufacturing does 
not necessarily translate into faster deindustrialization in cross-section of countries. 
 
Figure 5: Scattergram Showing the Relationship between Differential in the Average Annual Growth 
Rate of Labor Productivity between Manufacturing and Services (Horizontal axis) and Change in the 
Percentage of the Labor force in Manufacturing (Vertical Axis), 20 OECD Countries, 1970-2007 
 
      Source: EU Klems Database, STAN Database (OECD)22 
 
A number of economists have referred to deindustrialization that arises from income and substitution 
or relative-price effects as ‘positive’ deindustrialization. Such deindustrialization, which takes place as 
a result of systematic changes in consumption patterns over the course of economic development and 
faster productivity growth in manufacturing relative to services, is labelled as ‘positive’ because it is 
viewed not as a pathological or undesirable phenomenon, but as a symptom of economic success, the 
natural effect of industrial dynamism (Alderson, 1999:706; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999:19).  
                                                          
21 The technological argument has also been questioned by some scholars. See e.g. Nordhaus (2005,2006) 
22 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
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Intersectoral Division of Labor (Outsourcing) 
 
While a substantial part of the literature on the causes of structural change has investigated the final 
demand channels - income and relative price effects - through which structural change may take place 
in market economies, a few studies have recently pointed out the importance of taking explicitly into 
account all goods and services embodied in the final products, as firms producing the final products 
are in turn consumer of goods and services via intermediate inputs. This research recommendatio has 
been motivated by empirical evidence showing that a number of services for which final demand plays 
only a relatively small role23, especially professional and business services, finance and real estate, have 
experienced a significant growth in advanced countries over the last few decades24. As documented 
by Berlingieri (2014), the employment share of professional and business services increased by 9.2% 
percentage points in the US between 1948 and 2007, contributing 40% of total employment growth in 
services. With finance and real estate, these activities contributed 50% of total employment growth 
and 94% of total GDP growth in US services. As shown in appendix 5 and 6, finance, real estate and 
professional and business services (PBS) have also dramatically grown in Europe since 1970. By way of 
illutsratuon, employment in those services was multiplied by around three in the EU15 between 1970 
and 2007, which corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 3.1%. By comparison, employment 
only grew at a rate of 0.2% in the whole economy. PBS accounted for a large part of the growth, as 
employment in PBS was multiplied by around four, leading to a sharp rise in the share of PBS in total 
employment in the EU15 from 3.4 to 12.7%. According to Berlingieri (2014), a key source of the changes 
in the use of intermediate inputs over time, and of the real evolution of the input-output structure of 
advanced economies, has been ‘outsourcing’ or ‘contracting out’. Thus, many activities such as design, 
catering, cleaning and transport that were previously performed in-house by manufacturing firms have 
been increasingly outsourced to specialized service providers, inducing a reclassification of economic 
activity in favor of services. This evolution has sometimes been referred to as the ‘statistical artefact’ 
or ‘statistical illusion’ aspect of the deindustrialization process (Tregenna, 2015). A wider definition of 
the manufacturing sector, which would include all the service inputs embodied in the final output of 
the manufacturing sector, wouldn’t only increase the size of the sector but also likely reduce the extent 
of deindustrialization25. Figure 6 below plots the changes in the employment shares of manufacturing 
and finance, real estate and PBS between 1970 and 2007 for a set of selected advanced countries. It 
reveals, among others, that the higher the rise in the share of finance, real estate and PBS in national 
employment, the more deindustrialization on average. 
                                                          
23 These services are said to exhibit a relatively high degree of “forward linkage”, a measure for assessing the interconnection 
of a sector with the rest of the economy. See e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2012). 
24 Based on the early contributions of Katouzian (1970) and Singelmann (1978), the aggregate services sector is sometimes 
decomposed in the literature into ‘distributive services’ (transportation, wholesale and retail trade, etc.), ‘producer services’ 
(banking, insurance, real estate and PBS such as engineering and architectural services, accounting and bookkeeping, legal 
services, etc.), ‘social services’ (medical and health services, hospitals and education, etc.), and ‘personal services’ (domestic 
services, hotels and lodging, eating and drinking, etc.). The first two categories are traditionally considered as being related 
to goods production, although ‘producer services’ are also provided as intermediate inputs for the production of services. By 
contrast, the last two categories are traditionally considered as delivering final or consumer services (Schettkat and Yocarini, 
2006).  
25 For instance, the 2013 Industrial development Report (2013) estimates through an accounting exercise that the number of 
manufacturing-related jobs in services worldwide amounted to 73 million in 1995, then rose to 95 million in 2009 due in part 
to outsourcing. These figures are found by using input-output data allowing the computation of the job-content of services 
that go as inputs into manufacturing.  
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Figure 6: Scattergram Showing the Relationship between Change in the Percentage of the Labor 
Force in Finance, Real Estate, and PBS (Horizontal Axis) and Change in the Percentage of the         
Labor Force in Manufacturing (Vertical Axis), 20 OECD countries, 1970-200726 
 
           Source: EU Klems Database, STAN Database (OECD)27 
 
Figure 6 thus suggests that the decline in manufacturing employment has been associated with the 
growth of services for which final demand plays only a relatively small role, especially of professional 
and business services. Some part of deindustrialization may then be explained by a real mutation of 
the production system characterized by increased outsourcing of activities away from manufacturing. 
Unfortunately, long-time series on internationally comparable and detailed input-output data for the 
advanced countries, which would allow an accounting valuation of the evolution of the manufacturing 
firms’ externalization strategy, are missing today. As an indirect alternative measure, Demmou (2010) 
proposes to have a look at the evolution of the ratio of intermediate consumption over gross output 
in manufacturing over time. Data on intermediate consumption and gross output are available in the 
STAN Database and the EU Klems Database for most advanced countries. As shown in appendix 7, the 
share of intermediate inputs in manufacturing output grew in virtually all countries between 1970 and 
2007, with truly some acceleration in the 1990s, a situation already emphasized by Demmou (2010) 
for the French case. In the EU15, this share rose from 0.64 to 0.66 between 1970 and 1990, and from 
0.66 to 0.72 between 1990 and 2007. This evolution potentially highlights a higher division of labor in 
the economy, with some possible implications in terms of productive efficiency. Interestingly, figure 7 
below shows in a cross-section of advanced countries that the degree of deindustrialization, i.e. the 
negative change in the percentage of the labor force in manufacturing, is positively correlated to the 
evolution of the ratio of intermediate consumption over gross output in manufacturing between 1970 
and 2007. To the best of our knowledge, the hypothesis of outsourcing, seen as part of the explanation 
of relative manufacturing decline, has never been formally tested within an econometric framework 
including all identified primary sources of deindustrialization. The present study has the hope of filling 
this gap.  
                                                          
26 The data for the US begin in 1977. 
27 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
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Figure 7: Scattergram of the Relationship between Change in the Ratio of Intermediate Consumption 
over Gross Output in Manufacturing (Horizontal Axis) and Change in the Percentage of the Labor 
Force in Manufacturing (Vertical Axis), 20 OECD Countries, 1970-2007 
 
         Source: EU Klems Database, STAN Database (OECD)28 
 
In addition to outsourcing from manufacturing, Fuchs (1968) also highlights the potential effect on 
structural change of contracting out services that were previously produced not in the firm but in the 
household. While these services are indeed not valuated in national accounts when produced by the 
households, they officially enter the service sector when produced by the market, a situation labelled 
as the ‘marketization of home production’. According to Fuchs (1968), contracting out services that 
were once produced in the household becomes more efficient as income increases (Kongsamut et al., 
2001). In line with this view, a strand of the literature devoted to identifying the causes of structural 
change has explicitly introduced home production into analysis as a factor likely to explain some part 
of the labor market shift towards services (see e.g. Freeman and Schettkat, 2005; Ngai and Pissarides, 
2008; Rogerson, 2008; Buera and Kaboski, 2012a and 2012b; Barany and Siegel, 201429). In parallel, a 
number of papers have investigated the interaction between structural change, the marketization of 
home production and female work to explain the evolution of gender outcomes in working hours and 
wages (see e.g. Ngai and Pissarides, 2008; Rendall, 2014; Ngai and Petrongolo, 2015). These papers 
have been motivated by a few stylized facts revealing notably a rise in female work - which took place 
entirely (in net terms) in the service sector - and women’s relative wages, and a decline in women’s 
working hours in the household (Ngai and Pissarides, 2008). For instance, Ngai and Petrongolo (2015) 
develops a model in which the growth of services, driven by structural change and the marketization 
of home production, acts as a gender-biased demand shift raising women’s relative wages and market 
hours.     
                                                          
28 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
29 Barany and Siegel (2014, 2015) interestingly identify structural change as a driving force behind the polarization of the labor 
market in the US, a phenomenon characterized by the relative growth of wages and employment of high-wage occupations 
and low-wage occupations compared to middle-wage occupations. This account of polarization of the labor market adds to 
the ‘routinization’ hypothesis according to which the ICT substitute for middle-skill and so middle-wage (routine) occupations, 
whereas they complement the high-skilled and high-wage occupations (Barany and Siegel, 2015:2) (see e.g. Autor et al., 2003, 
2006), Autor and Dorn (2013), Goos, et al. (2014), Michaels et al. (2014), Feng and Graetz (2015).     
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International trade 
 
Most theoretical models of structural change have primarily focused on the “internal” factors likely to 
generate structural change in one specific economy, thus implicitly considering that this economy is 
not interacting with the rest of the world. One crucial implication of this hypothesis is that sectoral 
productions must necessarily reflect the corresponding household decisions in terms of consumption 
and investment (Herrendorf et al., 2014). A simple look at the data of any country yet clearly reveals 
that such conditions are never satisfied in reality. As noted by Matsuyama (2009), “we need to keep 
reminding ourselves of the simple truth: we live in an interdependent global economy and our planet, 
the world economy, is the only closed economy we know of”. Trade allows sectoral consumption and/or 
investment to be different from sectoral production at a country level. According to traditional trade 
theory, opening up the borders brings about a reallocation of economic activity across sectors within 
each country involved in trade. This sectoral reallocation largely takes place as a result of comparative 
advantage(s) driven, among others, by technology and factor endowments. Consequently, a country’s 
economic structure is directly affected by the specialization patterns induced by trade30. In addition, 
trade has the potential to boost productivity, especially in the sectors exposed to foreign competition, 
and to spur income growth, thus affecting the sectoral expenditures shares, and hence the economic 
structure, through both the income and substitution effects. Matsuyama (2009) has been pioneer in 
studying explicitly the effects of international trade on structural change and so relative manufacturing 
decline. Taking into account the global perspective of structural change through a rigorous modelling 
of the interdependence across countries, Matsuyama (2009) has notably shown that an economy with 
comparatively higher productivity growth in manufacturing can temporarily know an increase in the 
share of labor employed in manufacturing and delay its process of deindustrialization. As an attempt 
to generalize Matsuyama’s intuition, Uy et al. (2013) have recently developed a two-country model in 
which a country having or reinforcing some comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector can 
exhibit the hump-shape in manufacturing labor observed in the data for the currently rich countries, 
even if manufacturing is the most technologically dynamic sector.  
 
Despite the relative lack, at least until recently, of a theoretical growth framework devoted to analyzing 
the dynamics of structural change under the more realistic assumption of open borders, the impact of 
international trade on manufacturing in the postwar period - which has witnessed a large boom in the 
volume of world exchanges, notably due to declining transport costs and invisible transaction costs in 
trade (Krugman, 1996) - has long been investigated in the empirical literature for different regions of 
the world. By way of illustration, Dodzin and Vamvakidis’ (2004) estimates suggest that trade leads to 
industrialization, as well as to a relative decline of agriculture, in developing countries over the period 
1960-2000. Providing a more nuanced picture for developing nations, Szirmai (2012) shows that some 
countries in both Latin America and Africa have experienced a process of premature deindustrialization 
since 1980, a phenomenon that can potentially have significant (large) impacts on productivity, income 
                                                          
30 In a study linking economic integration and structural change, Imbs et al. (2012) argue that countries specialize because 
they integrate internationally, with their regions producing according to the global pattern of comparative advantage. In line 
with this view, Rowthorn and Wells (1987) went so far as to contend that a country’s trade specialization was the single most 
important factor able to explain the differences in the employment structure of advanced countries. 
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growth and institutions31. In parallel to industrialization of emerging countries in the second half of the 
20th century, especially in Asia (see e.g. Weiss and Tribe, 2016), the first signs of deindustrialization 
have been detected in advanced countries. Consequently, global integration between rich and poor 
countries has commonly been blamed for the relative manufacturing decline observed in advanced 
countries, what Krugman (1996) has called the ‘deindustrialization hypothesis’. For instance, Autor et 
al. (2013) conclude from the main specification of their model, based on monopolistic competition and 
variations in industry labor productivities across countries, that rising Chinese import competition may 
explain one-quarter of the aggregate drop in US manufacturing employment32. Autor et al’s Ricardian 
model interestingly shows that trade can influence the allocation of labor between the traded and 
non-traded sectors33 if trade is imbalanced. Given the assumptions of the model, balance trade indeed 
implies that the job-content of exports is exactly equal to the job-content of imports. Imbalanced trade 
is one way of breaking this symmetry34. Another way is to consider Heckscher-Ohlin or specific-factor 
models with heterogeneous sectoral production functions with regard to factor intensities. Such kind 
of specification indeed allows for a country’s comparative advantage to be also driven by some 
national disparities in relative factor endowments. The job-content of exports can then be different 
from the job-content of imports even if trade is balanced as relative prices are not solely driven by 
disparities in industry labor productivities. Using input-output data on OECD countries for 1978-1995 
to estimate the labor content embodied in changes in manufacturing output resulting from changing 
patterns of trade, Kucera and Milberg (2003) thus find that changes in foreign trade of manufactures 
had a significant negative net effect on manufacturing employment in all advanced countries, with the 
labor-intensive manufacturing sectors experiencing relatively large employment losses due to growing 
North-South trade35.  
 
Trade models are particularly relevant to understand why trade leads countries to specialize in some 
traded sectors according to some comparative advantages(s), thus generating structural change. As 
shown in appendix 8, international specialization in manufacturing has been associated with a rise in 
the share of imports in domestic final demand for manufactures in advanced economies, an evolution 
that also reflects, at least to some extent, the rising dependence of national manufacturing on trade 
and exports. With respect to this indicator, large differences can be observed across countries. By way 
of illustration, while the share of imports in domestic final demand for manufactures was around 12% 
in Japan in 1995 (rising to 23% in 2011), it was around 72% in Belgium (rising to 83% in 2011) and 89% 
(rising to 93% in 2011) in Luxembourg for the same reference year. While countries truly specialize in 
some manufacturing sectors, Herrendorf et al. (2014) have also recently drawn attention to growing 
trade in services, as this trend is likely to have dramatic influence on the nature and speed of structural 
                                                          
31 See e.g. Palma (2008 and 2014), Szirmai (2012), Imbs (2013), Rodrick (2015) and Tregenna (2015) for further evidence of 
premature deindustrialization in Africa and Latin America. 
32 In the same vein, Pierce and Schott (2014) find a link between the sharp decline in US manufacturing employment beginning 
in 2001 and a change in US trade policy that eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese imports. 
33 In the literature on trade, traded sectors often restrictively refer to the manufacturing sectors, while non-traded sectors 
typically refer to services. 
34 See e.g. Craighead and Hineline (2015) for a study examining the compositional changes (structural change) that occur in 
both developing and developed countries experiencing current account reversals, defined as large and persistent decreases 
in current account deficits, using sectoral-level data on output and employment growth. 
35 In the same vein, Wood (1994, 1995) finds that international trade reduced the demand for unskilled labor in advanced 
countries between 1970 and 1990. 
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change and deindustrialization in countries like the US that seem to have a comparative advantage in 
certain tradable services.  
 
In addition to sectoral specialization induced by trade, it is noteworthy that foreign competition leads 
global firms, and especially manufacturing firms, to seek continuous improvement. Global firms indeed 
have strong incentives to increase their degree of competitiveness on world markets. And this can be 
achieved through different channels. For instance, global firms may invest in research and innovation 
activities, modify their production processes, and especially the ratio of labor to capital, and reorganize 
themselves at a world scale. Due to declining trade costs and the progress in ICT, offshoring - defined 
as the relocation abroad of a company business process (to unaffiliated firms or to own affiliates) - has 
thus become increasingly profitable over the last decades, contributing to larger volume of trade36 and 
higher degree of international fragmentation of the production37. Offshoring, which allows global firms 
to enhance the division of labor and simultaneously reap the benefits associated with the comparative 
advantage(s) of different countries, can involve not only supporting processes, such as accounting and 
administrative tasks38, but also operational processes, such as manufacturing, with some potentially 
significant implications in terms of deindustrialization in advanced countries. While offshoring has very 
often been considered fearfully as a major threat to manufacturing jobs and associated with massive 
unemployment in advanced countries, thus explaining why the topic has been particularly prominent 
in the political and scientific debate, a number of scholars have tended to qualify this pessimistic view, 
contending that offshoring can generate significant efficiency gains and enhance productivity growth39, 
especially when low-productivity-growth activities are offshored (see e.g. Stijepic and Wagner, 2008; 
Stijepic, 2011). Robert-Nicoud (2008:518) moreover argues that offshoring, and so the specialization 
by function rather than by sector, relaxes the pressure to move abroad, notably to low-wage countries, 
the entire manufacturing production chain, thus helping to retain the core activities in manufacturing, 
the ‘complex tasks’ like design, R&D and post-production activities in advanced countries40. 
 
A number of econometric studies have attempted to quantify the relative importance of globalization 
or ‘external’ factors on deindustrialization in advanced countries (see e.g. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 
1997, 1999; Alderson, 1997, 1999; Gaston, 1998; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2004; Brady and Denniston, 
2006; Kollmeyer, 2009; Kang and Lee, 2011; Rowthorn and Coutts, 2013). While these studies find a 
significant negative effect of globalization on relative manufacturing employment, they largely suggest 
that internal factors were quantitatively more important in accounting for deindustrialization. Given 
                                                          
36 Offshoring has been one of the most rapidly growing components of trade (Grossman and Helpman, 2005; Blinder, 2007). 
37 Through an empirical exercise aiming at slicing up the global value chains, Timmer et al. (2014) document that international 
fragmentation, as measured by the foreign value-added content of production, has rapidly increased since the early 1990s. 
38 The term ‘offshore outsourcing’ is often used to refer to outsourcing abroad of service-type activities supporting production 
that were previously performed in the manufacturing firm (see Manning et al., 2008).  
39 See e.g. Bhagwati et al., 2004; Samuelson et al., 2004, Amiti and Konings, 2007; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Robert-
Nicoud, 2008; Amit and Wei, 2009; Goldberg et al., 2010; Stijepic and Wagner, 2012 
40 Using recent data on foreign direct investment (FDI), a number of studies have attempted to assess the impact of offshoring 
and relocation on manufacturing employment in advanced countries (see e.g. Marin, 2004; Brady and Denniston, 2006, Kang 
and Lee, 2011). More generally, the use of data on FDI, which is sometimes split into defensive and expansionary types (see 
e.g. Chen and Chen, 1995), has recently gained in importance in deindustrialization studies, especially as the global landscape 
of FDI has shifted to the developing and emerging world. As noted by Kudina and Pitelis (2014), who provide strong empirical 
support for a relationship between FDI inflows into developing and emerging economies and deindustrialization of developed 
economies, FDI inflows into developing world exceeded that to the developed economies for the first time in 2010. 
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the lack of readily available data and the difficulty to empirically identify and measure all the different 
channels through which globalization may influence structural change, these studies typically use data 
on trade flows in manufactures, both imports and exports, as a proxy to examine the broad impact of 
globalization on relative manufacturing employment. Besides the growing penetration of developing 
nations in world exchanges, the trade argument has been empirically funded on a severe deterioration 
of the trade balance in manufactures in a number of advanced countries, especially in the US and the 
UK. As shown in figure 8 below, the US and the UK, which have experienced a relatively high degree of 
deindustrialization, rank amongst the countries where the ratio of exports to imports in manufactures 
has declined the most41.  
 
Figure 8: Scattergram of the Relationship between Absolute Change in the Ratio of Manufactures 
Exports over Manufactures Imports (Horizontal Axis) and Change in the Percentage of the Labor 
Force in Manufacturing (Vertical Axis), 18 OECD Countries, 1970-2007 
 
         Source: OECD’s International Trade by Commodities Database 
 
4. Description of the data and empirical methodology 
 
Description of the data 
 
The dependent variable measures the share of a country’s workforce employed in the manufacturing 
sector. Computed by use of the indicator “total hours worked”, and not “total persons engaged”, this 
variable captures the extent to which deindustrialization has taken place in advanced countries since 
the 1970s. By contrast with most previous empirical studies, this variable is log-transformed to allow 
                                                          
41 While Japan has also known a large drop in the ratio of exports to imports in manufactures, it is noteworthy that, contrary 
to the US and the UK, the Japanese trade balance in manufactures is still largely positive in 2007. 
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for a potentially non-linear but monotonic relationship between relative manufacturing employment 
and the explanatory variables. In addition to a seemingly better fit of the data, this choice is motivated 
upstream by the limited value range of the dependent variable. As the share of a country’s workforce 
in manufacturing is comprised between 0 and 1, one can reasonably expect the marginal effect of any 
explanatory variable to be not constant in the different estimated models. Under the assumption that 
no one factor could never completely deindustrialize a country, the absence of transformation of the 
dependent variable may lead to overestimate the impact of the factors that have early contributed to 
deindustrialization in advanced countries compared to the factors that really started operating when 
the share of manufacturing in total labour force had already declined. By way of illustration, trade is 
usually believed to have begun affecting relative manufacturing employment later than internal factors 
like economic maturity and unbalanced productivity growth. Data on employment at industry-level are 
derived from the EU Klems database (ISIC Rev.3) for all countries except Canada and Norway. For these 
two countries, data are retrieved from the OECD’s STAN (structural analysis) database (ISIC Rev.3). 
 
The key explanatory variables are designed to capture the four primary sources of deindustrialization 
highlighted in the theoretical literature. The first explanatory variable measures a country’s log of gross 
domestic product per capita expressed in 1990 international dollars as reported by Maddison (2013). 
In order to allow for a non-monotonous impact of real income on a country’s share of manufacturing 
in total employment, and thus to test the hump-shaped relationship between relative manufacturing 
employment and economic maturity suggested by figure 3, we include a squared term for this variable 
in the different regressions. 
 
The second explanatory variable aims at capturing the effects of cross-sector heterogeneity in labor 
productivity growth on relative manufacturing employment. It measures the log of the ratio of labor 
productivity in manufacturing over labor productivity in services. Labor productivity in manufacturing 
and services is computed using data on sectoral employment and real value added from the EU Klems 
database (ISIC Rev.3) and the OECD’s STAN (structural analysis) database (ISIC Rev.3). The indicator of 
employment is “total hours worked”, and not “total persons engaged”, which dramatically improves 
the accuracy of the labor productivity measure. Provided that the elasticity of substitution between 
manufactured goods and services is relatively low, this second variable is expected to affect negatively 
a country’s share of manufacturing in total employment.     
 
The third explanatory variable is related to outsourcing. In the absence of accurate and reliable data 
on this phenomenon, outsourcing of services from the manufacturing sector is measured indirectly, as 
it has been suggested by Demmou (2010), by looking at the evolution of the ratio of intermediates to 
gross output in the manufacturing sector. Sectoral-level data on intermediate consumption and gross 
output are available in the EU Klems database (ISIC Rev.3) and the OECD’s STAN (structural analysis) 
database (ISIC Rev.3).  
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The fourth set of explanatory variables is intended to measure the broad impact of international trade 
in manufactures on relative manufacturing employment. While many empirical studies have resorted 
to statistics on trade balance in manufactures to investigate the effects of trade on a country’s share 
of manufacturing in total employment, we follow the approach adopted by scholars like Saeger (1997) 
and Kollmeyer (2009) by disaggregating gross trade flows into imports and exports for the North and 
South. This choice allows for North-South global integration to be linked to deindustrialization even if 
North-South trade is roughly balanced, as there is strong evidence that traded manufactures between 
the North and South are of different factor intensities. One therefore expects the coefficient on gross 
imports from the South to be significantly larger in absolute value (and of opposite sign) compared to 
the coefficient on gross exports to the South. Data on trade flows are from the OECD’s International 
Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS) database which categorizes all of the world’s countries into six 
geographic regions, i.e. Africa, Asia, Central and South America, Europe, North America and Oceania. 
In line with recent Kollmeyer (2009)’s study, the South is here defined as Africa, Asia, Central and South 
America, and Oceania. The North covers Europe and North America. Some adjustments are made to 
these broad regional categories by moving Mexico (North America) and Turkey (Europe) to the South, 
and by moving Australia and New Zealand (Oceania) and Israel, Japan, and South Korea (Asia) to the 
North. Consistent with Wood (1994, 1995)’s influential work, trade in manufactures is defined as gross 
imports or exports in SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) sections 5 to 8. For international 
comparison purposes, the values of imports and exports are usually expressed as a percentage of total 
GDP. By contrast with previous deindustrialization studies, we decide to express imports and exports 
as a percentage of gross output in the manufacturing sector, and not of total GDP, for all countries. It 
appears to us that this new variable is better suited for capturing the effects of trade in manufactured 
goods on relative manufacturing employment. Indeed, the ratio of imports or exports in manufactures 
to total GDP is likely to move even if the economic situation of the manufacturing sector, assessed in 
terms of real production and trade, does not evolve over time, as GDP also includes the production of 
services. Conversely, this ratio may theoretically stay constant even if the situation of manufacturing 
dramatically changes over time. It may even be the case that the two ratios, i.e. the ratio of imports or 
exports to total GDP and the ratio of imports or exports to total gross output in manufacturing, move 
in opposite directions. By way of illustration, the ratio of total imports in manufactures to total GDP in 
Norway dropped from 21% to 16% between 1970 and 2007, while the ratio of imports in manufactures 
to total gross output in manufacturing rose from 37% to 48% over the same period. As manufacturing 
activity is affected by a number of factors, both internal and external factors, the effect of trade should 
logically be considered, for any given year, regarding the current activity of the manufacturing sector. 
It is also noteworthy that trade flows in manufactures are typically measured in gross terms in most 
macro datasets. While recent efforts have been made to better take into account the rising countries’ 
specialization in global value chains (GVCs) and derive statistics on trade in value added terms42, all the 
long historical time series of economic indicators on trade are still expressed in gross terms. That’s the 
reason why, for consistency purposes, we choose to express exports and imports in manufactures as 
a percentage of gross output, ant not value added, in manufacturing. 
 
                                                          
42 Thus, the 2015 edition of the TiVA (Trade in Value Added) database provides a number of trade indicators for 61 countries 
covering OECD, EU28, G20, most East and South-east Asian countries and a set of South American countries. The industry list 
covers 34 unique industrial sectors, including 16 manufacturing and 14 services sectors. The years covered are 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2008 to 2011. 
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A fifth set of explanatory variables report the annual flows, the inflows and outflows, of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). While FDI inflows are expected to support domestic manufacturing employment, FDI 
outflows are contrastingly expected to reduce the demand of labour in home manufacturing, especially 
when FDI outflows are of defensive type, i.e. intended to restore some degree of competitiveness of 
home manufacturing in a global environment. Statistics onFDI flows in manufacturing should ideally 
be used. Unfortunately, sectoral-level data on FDI flows for advanced countries only begin in 1985 and 
are very incomplete. Therefore, this study uses data on total FDI flows. For international comparison 
purposes, FDI flows are taken as a percentage of total GDP. Data come from the OECD International 
Direct Investment by Industrial Sector Database.   
 
Finally, a set of control variables is also included into the regressions. Following previous research, two 
first control variables are considered. The first one, i.e. the log of unemployment rate, aims at capturing 
what Rowthorn and Wells (1987) called the ‘failure effect’ or ‘negative deindustrialization’. According 
to this argument, deindustrialization may also takes place as a result of a large and persistent structural 
disequilibrium in the macroeconomy, which is manifested in the poor performance in manufacturing 
and the overall economy. As part of this vicious circle, the labor shed by negative deindustrialization is 
not absorbed by the broad service sector, contributing to a rise in the unemployment rates and the 
share of services in total workforce. The second control variable measures the log of gross domestic 
fixed capital formation as a share of total GDP. As stressed by Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997, 1999), 
the rationale for using this variable is that capital investment is relatively focused on manufacturing, 
that is to say manufacturing intensive. A third control variable, i.e. the log of the participation rate for 
women aged between 15 and 64, is also injected into the different regression models. This variable is 
introduced as a proxy for the women’s working hours in the household to capture the effects of the 
marketization of home production on structural change. As documented by a number of scholars for 
the US, there is a strong negative correlation between female work and women’s working hours in the 
household (see e.g. Ngai and Petrongolo, 2015 and Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2016).  
 
Empirical methodology 
 
In order to study the factors that are associated with deindustrialization, defined as the decline in the 
share of manufacturing in total employment, we use panel data for 20 OECD countries43 from 1977 to 
2007. Our sample thus contains a maximum of 620 separate observations, although some observations 
are missing data for some explanatory variables44. Panel data, which include the reporting of individual 
(countries in this case) and temporal variations, allow for richer econometric specifications than cross-
sectional or time series data and have the potential to greatly improve the power of statistical models. 
While the pooled specifications can be interesting to investigate the role of various factors in shaping 
differences in the sectoral structure of employment across advanced countries (see e.g. Rowthorn and 
                                                          
43 These 20 countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US.  
44 Data on trade in manufactures are largely missing for Belgium and Luxembourg before the 2000s. These two countries are 
so removed from the regressions including the variables on trade. In the same vein, data on FDI are largely missing for Greece 
and Ireland. These two countries are then removed from the regressions including FDI variables. 
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Wells, 1987; Saeger, 1997; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy 1999, Alderson, 1999), error components panel 
models controlling for persistent and time invariant country-specific effects, and thus dealing with the 
heterogeneity bias that can seriously affect pooled OLS estimates when the observations for particular 
units are structurally related to one another, is better suited to analyze the factors associated with the 
process of deindustrialization. The fixed-effects model (FEM) and random-effects model (REM) are the 
two dominant approaches for estimating the error components panel specification. Based on a Breush-
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects, with the null hypothesis being that variances across 
entities is zero, and an F test of the heterogeneity of the individual component in a fixed-effects model, 
the homogeneity assumption, i.e. the assumption of no panel effect, is rejected at conventional levels 
of significance. A panel data specification including country-specific effects is therefore preferred. 
 
The choice between fixed or random effects models typically depends on the properties of the error 
components, especially of whether or not the individual component is independent of the explanatory 
variables. If the individual component is correlated with the regressors, it is usual to treat the individual 
effects as an additional set of parameters to be jointly estimated with the other coefficients of interest, 
a situation termed fixed-effects. The fixed-effects (FE) estimator, also called the within estimator, then 
provides consistent estimates for the model’s parameters. By contrast, if the individual component is 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the regressors, a situation termed random-effects, it is 
more efficient to apply some form of feasible generalized least square (FGLS) estimator. As noted by 
Judson and Owen (1999), the fixed-effects model has become a common choice for macroeconomists 
as it generally proves to be more appropriate than a random-effects model for many macro datasets 
for at least two reasons. First, the typical macro panel contains most of the countries of interest, and 
so does not only cover data representing a random sample from a much larger population of countries. 
Our study clarly includes most economically advanced countries. Second, if the individual component 
truly captures time-invariant omitted variables, it is very likely that unit-specific effects are correlated 
with one or more of the model’s regressors. This can be tested by performing a Hausman test. Such a 
test fails to indicate that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the model’s regressors. For these 
two reasons, we use a fixed-effects model. In line with most previous research, we add time-specific, 
group-invariant effects in the specification to account for unmeasured effects occurring across time 
but being constant across groups (countries), thus ending up with a two-way fixed-effects model. The 
inclusion of time dummies in the model is validated by a formal F test rejecting the null at conventional 
levels of significance that the coefficients for all years are jointly equal to zero. A number of additional 
tests are performed to investigate some potential complications arising from the use of panel data. 
These tests reveal the presence of spatial correlation or cross-sectional dependence, serial correlation, 
and group-wise heteroskedasticity45. To deal with these complications, we estimate the two-way fixed-
effects model by means of two different procedures, namely ‘feasible generalized least squares’ (FGLS) 
and ‘panel-corrected standard error’ (PCSE). The PCSE procedure is actually an alternative to FGLS for 
fitting linear panel models when the disturbances are not assumed to be independent and identically 
distributed. While the FGLS estimator is more efficient if the assumed covariance structure is correct, 
Beck and Katz (1995) have nonetheless drawn attention towards the FGLS procedure, notably showing 
                                                          
45 The Pesaran’s test of spatial correlation rejects the null of cross-sectional independence across countries at the 1% level of 
significance, thus suggesting that the residuals in the specified model are contemporaneously dependent across panels. The 
Wooldridge test for first-order autocorrelation rejects the null of no serially correlated errors at the 1% level of significance. 
A modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity rejects the null of homoscedasticity at the 1% level of significance. 
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that the full FGLS variance-covariance estimates are typically unacceptably optimistic in the presence 
of the type of data analyzed by most social scientists - 10-20 panels with 10-40 periods per panel. 
 
We then extend the two-way fixed-effects model to explicitly include some temporal dependency into 
the analysis. There is a range of ways to add dynamics to the static equation46. In our study, we choose 
to include some lag(s) of the dependent variable as explanatory variable(s) into the regression. To the 
best of our knowledge, this kind of specification, which controls for the dynamics of the investigated 
process without treating them as a nuisance, has never been considered in the empirical literature on 
structural change. Generally speaking, the dynamic methods allow for the model to capture a potential 
dynamic effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable. While static panel implicitly 
makes the assumption that all explanatory variables have an instantaneous and only instantaneous 
impact, dynamic panel is indeed modelling a partial adjustment process that allows for adjustments to 
changes in the explanatory variables after the current period. As emphasized by Arellano (2003), the 
partial adjustment based approach, whose examples notably include the partial adjustment models of 
firm investment or labor demand, is especially relevant in the presence of adjustment costs and inertia. 
These adjustment costs can take a myriad of forms. In our study on deindustrialization, the adjustment 
costs might for instance come from the rigidities in the labor market. It is well known that employment, 
and so relative manufacturing employment, reacts with a delay to shifting macroeconomic conditions. 
The adjustment costs might also come from the force of habit in private consumption expenditures. 
The households indeed do not adjust instantaneously their consumption to changes in income. When 
considering a ‘lagged dependent variable’ (LDV) model, the standard estimators for static panel (with 
fixed individual effects), including the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator, can be shown 
to be inconsistent, thus generating biased estimates, because this dynamic specification raises some 
endogeneity issue (Nickell, 1981). To address this issue, a number of consistent instrumental variables 
(IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators have been proposed as alternatives in the 
economic literature (see e.g. Anderson and Hsiao, 1981, 1982; Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000). All these estimators rely upon transforming the initial 
model in first differences in order to eliminate the unobserved individual heterogeneity, then using 
one or more lag(s) of the dependent variable as internal instrument(s) for the differenced one-time 
lagged dependent variable. A weakness of IV and GMM estimators is that their properties hold when 
the number of cross-sectional units is sufficiently large, so they can be severely biased in panel data 
with a small number of cross-sectional units, a situation encountered in many macro panels (Bruno, 
2005a). In line with this result, Judson and Owen (1999) conclude from Monte Carlo simulations that 
the Kiviet’s (1995) bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVC) estimator should be preferred when the number of 
cross-sectional units is relatively small. In case the corrected LSDV is not practical47, Judson and Owen 
then recommend using the simpler LSDV when the number of time periods is sufficiently large, as the 
bias generated by the LSDV estimator substantially declines with time dimension. Moreover, using an 
RMSE criterion, the LSDV estimator proves to perform just as well or better than many alternatives 
when the number of time periods is sufficiently large. With regard to this performance, Beck and Katz 
(2011) argue in favor of the simpler and more flexible LSDV for long time-series-cross-section data, and 
                                                          
46 Since the dynamics inherent in the initial model with serially correlated errors are treated as a nuisance leading to some 
estimation difficulties, we refer to the initial setup as the ‘static model’. 
47 For instance, the LSDV estimator was initially not suitable for unbalanced panel data. Extending the results by Kiviet (1995, 
1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2003), Bruno (2005b) later filled in this gap. 
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this independently from the practicability of the LSDVC estimator, as there are real costs in using the 
Kiviet correction, not the least of which is that standard errors will need to be calculated by some sort 
of block bootstrap. Following this recommendation, we estimate our dynamic specification with both 
FGLS and PCSE, taking into account the complications arising from the use of panel data. 
 
As part of the methodological discussion, one also needs to tackle the issue of non-stationarity in time-
series-cross-section data. The analysis of non-stationary series has been very prominent in time series 
econometrics during the last three decades following the seminal and pioneering work of Engle and 
Granger (1987). It is therefore legitimate to wonder about the implications of non-stationary series for 
panel data, especially as political economy data, which is typically observed for relatively short periods 
of time (20-40 years), often appear to be integrated of order one, I(1), when resorting to traditional 
tests48. These series are said to exhibit a unit root, which means that shocks to these series accumulate 
forever. In the presence of integrated series, time series econometrics has long cautioned against the 
risks of a spurious regression as the least squares estimator will have a non-zero probability limit as T 
goes to infinity even in the extreme case of independent random walks. Fortunately, as shown by Kao 
(1999), the problem of spurious regression can be avoided by using panel data as the least squares 
estimator, applied on demeaned data, consistently estimates the true value of the parameters (Smith, 
2001; Smith and Fuertes, 2016). The FE estimator can also be shown to provide consistent estimates 
of what Phillips and Moon (1999 and 2000) called the “long-run average rergression coefficients” when 
the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are significantly related to each other, no matter 
whether or not the disturbance process is stationary. With respect to this point, it may be the case that 
equilibrium or arbitrage conditions imply that certain linear combinations of integrated (of order one) 
variables are stationary. The disturbance process is then stationary and the variables are said to be 
cointegrated. As suggested by Kao (1999) and Pedroni (1995, 1999), we perform a Dickey-Fuller test 
of cointegration to check whether the disturbance process is stationary in our static model. This test 
reveals that the errors are stationary. Additional tests based on an Error-Correction-Model approach, 
i.e. those suggested by Westerlund (2007) and Gengenbach et al (2009), lead to the same conclusion. 
In these conditions, the FE estimator can be shown to estimate consistently the hypothetized single 
cointegrating vector (see e.g. Smith, 2001; Smith and Fuertes, 2016). Following Beck and Katz’s (2011) 
guidance, we also check wether the error process is stationary in our dynamic model. As it is the case, 
the dynamic methods described in the previous section can be used, especially as our study’s modeling 
issue is not at all about the univariate properties of any time-series, but the properties of the stochastic 
process that generated the y’s conditional on the observed covariates (that is, the error process)49. 
                                                          
48 Performing a number of Fisher tests for panel unit root using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, all the variables of our model, 
i.e. the dependent variable and explanatory variables, appear to be integrated of order one. Their first difference is stationary.  
49 As part of a rich discussion on the implications of non-stationarity in political economy data, Beck and Katz (2011) caution 
against jumping too quickly to any formal conclusion on the stationarity of any political economy series as political economy 
data is typically observed annually for relatively short periods of time (often 20-40 years). Thus, while the series may be very 
persistent, we have no idea if a longer time period would show the series to be stationary or non-stationary. Moreover, Beck 
and Katz (2011) argue that many political economy series that are shown to have a unit root based on traditional stationarity 
tests are not likely to exhibit the characteristics of I(1) series. Let’s take the example of relative manufacturing employment. 
As emphasized by Beck and Katz, if this series had a unit root, there would be tendency for it to wander far from its means 
and the variance of the observations would grow larger and larger over time. But by definition the country’s share of 
manufacturing in total workforce is bounded between zero and hundred per cent, which then bounds how large its variance 
can become. Further, if the series was I(1), then we would be equally likely to see an increase or decrease in the variable 
regardless of its present value. Is this the right characterization of this series?  
25 
 
Another source of inconsistent and potentially misleading results comes from the “heterogeneity bias” 
when one incorrectly makes the assumption of homogeneity of the slope parameters across countries 
(see e.g. Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Pesaran et al., 1997, 1999; Phillips and Moon, 2000; Im et al., 2003). 
A few techniques have been developed to estimate nonstationary panels in which the parameters are 
heterogeneous across groups. Two commonly used methods are the mean-group (MG) and pooled 
mean-group (PMG) estimators. The MG estimator (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995) relies on estimating 
N time-series regressions and averaging the coefficients, whereas the PMG estimator (see Pesaran et 
al., 1997 and 1999) relies on a combination of pooling and averaging of coefficients (Blackburn III and 
Frank, 2007). In both cases, the estimated model is an error correction model (ECM) derived from the 
reparametrization of an autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) dynamic panel model, of which the AR1 
and LDV specifications are special cases (see Beck and Katz, 2011). While both MG and PMG estimators 
allow the intercept, short-run coefficients, and error variances to differ across all panels, only the MG 
estimator allows the long run coefficients to be different. If the true model is heterogeneous, then the 
estimates obtained with the PMG estimator are inconsistent; the MG estimates are consistent in either 
case. As pointed out by Blackburn III and Frank (2007), the test of difference in these models can be 
performed with the familiar Hausman test. Such a test fails to reject the null hypothesis of systematic 
difference in coefficients. As a result, we conclude that the PMG estimator, which is efficient under the 
null hypothesis, is preferred. We perform another Hausman test to compare the MG estimator with 
the dynamic fixed-effect estimator, the latter restricting the long-run coefficients of the cointegrating 
vector to be equal across all panels, as well as the speed of adjustment coefficient and the short-run 
coefficients, while allowing panel-specific intercepts. Results indicate that the FE model is preferred 
over the MG model. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
The regression results are shown in table 350. While models 1 to 6 refer to the static analysis, model 7 
refers to the dynamic specification including one lag of the dependent variable, namely the share of a 
country’s labour force employed in the manufacturing sector. Model 1 isolates the effects of national 
affluence (GDP per capita) and unbalanced sectoral productivity growth (ratio of labor productivity in 
manufacturing over labor productivity in services). Model 2 also incorporates the explanatory variable 
intended to capture the effects of outsourcing on relative manufacturing employment, i.e. the ratio of 
intermediates to gross output in the manufacturing sector. Both models confirm a number of results 
delivered by previous research. They notably confirm the curvilinear, inverted U-shaped relationship 
between income per capita and relative manufacturing employment, and the negative relationship 
between relative apparent labor productivity in the manufacturing sector and relative manufacturing 
employment. Although the coefficient has the expected negative sign, model 2 fails to find a significant 
effect of the ratio of intermediates to total gross output in manufacturing on relative manufacturing 
employment, suggesting that this variable does not accurately capture the effects of outsourcing, i.e. 
the contracting-out of services previously produced in the manufacturing firm, on deindustrialization. 
Interestingly, this variable appears to be significant when using the FGSL procedure instead of the PCSE 
                                                          
50 For simplicity purposes, only the results obtained with the PCSE procedure are presented in table 3.  
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procedure. This result seemingly supports Beck and Katz (1995)’s findings that the FGLS procedure may 
produce too optimistic estimates when applied on typical political economy time-series cross-section 
data - 10-20 units with 10-40 periods per unit. Regarding the first control variable, i.e. unemployment, 
the coefficient is correctly signed in view of the “negative deindustrialization” thesis but not significant. 
The coefficient of the second control variable, i.e. the intensity of gross fixed capital formation, is also 
unsignificant. By contrast, the third control variable, i.e. the labor market participation rate of women, 
influences significantly (and negatively) relative manufacturing employment, thus confirming to some 
extent that the entire (net) rise in women’s hours has taken place in the broad service sector. 
 
Models 3 to 6 include the explanatory variables designed to capture the broad effect of globalization 
on relative manufacturing employment. These variables relate to trade in manufactures with the North 
and South and foreign direct investment (FDI). While the trade variables are expressed as a share of 
total GDP in model 3 and 4, they are taken as a share of total gross output in the manufacturing sector 
in model 5 and 6. As expected, the results look very different according to the variables that are used 
to measure the effects of trade on deindustrialization. In models 3 and 4, the coefficients of the trade 
variables, although they exhibit the expected sign, are unsignificant, a result that highly contrasts with 
previous empirical research. While this result could be due to the choice of a slightly different period 
of investigation51, we argue rather that it is because of an inaccurate definition of the trade variables. 
In model 5, the coefficients of the trade variables all appear highly significant with the expected sign. 
Thus, the exports are positively associated with the share a country’s workforce in the manufacturing 
sector, while the imports are negatively associated with this share. It is noteworthy that the coefficient 
of the variable measuring the imports from the South is significantly higher in absolute value than the 
coefficients of the other trade variables. This result proves the importance of disaggregating the trade 
flows into imports and exports, especially the trade flows with the South, an approach not followed by 
Kang and Lee (2011) when studying the effects of globalization on relative manufacturing employment 
in economically succesful countries. Interestingly, the coefficients of the two first control variables, i.e. 
the unemployment rate and the intensity of gross fixed capital formation, become significant with the 
expected sign when the trade variables are included into the regression. Model 6 shows that the main 
results from model 5 are still valid in presence of the FDI flows. With respect the FDI-related variables, 
the coefficients exhibit the expected sign but are unsignificant. Although this last finding might tempt 
one to conclude that the FDI flows are not an important determinant of structural change, especially 
of relative manufacturing employment, we do want to caution the reader against jumping too quickly 
to this conclusion as the FDI flows may have an important role on trade performance52
                                                          
51 Most previous empirical research on deindustrialization focuses on the period starting in 1970. 
52 In addition, data on FDI flows in manufacturing could not be used in this study. In a study covering a shorter time period, 
Kang and Lee (2011) thus find a significant effect of the FDI flows in manufacturing on relative manufacturing employment.  
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Table 3: FE-PCSE estimates of relative manufacturing employment for 18 OECD countries, 1977-2007 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
        
(Relative manufacturing employment)L       0,790*** 
(0,03) 
        
GDP/Capita 4,693*** 
(0.74) 
4,574*** 
(0,70) 
4,722*** 
(0,74) 
4,812*** 
(0,79) 
5,019*** 
(0,71) 
5,121*** 
(0,52) 
0,736** 
(0,35) 
(GDP/Capita)2 -0.225*** 
(0.04) 
-0,219*** 
(0,04) 
-0,229*** 
(0,04) 
-0,233*** 
(0,04) 
-0,249*** 
(0,04) 
-0,248*** 
(0,03) 
-0,038** 
(0,02) 
Unbalanced Productivity Growth (UPG) -0.152*** 
(0.02) 
-0,145*** 
(0,02) 
-0,136*** 
(0,02) 
-0,096*** 
(0,02) 
-0,187*** 
(0,02) 
-0,129*** 
(0,02) 
-0,038*** 
(0,01) 
(IC/GO) in manufacturing  -0,038 
(0,12) 
     
        
Exports to the North (% GDP)   0,097 
(0,07) 
0,052 
(0,08) 
   
Imports from the North (% GDP)   -0,165 
(0,11) 
-0,071 
(0,12) 
   
Exports to the South (% GDP)   0,224 
(0,19) 
0,113 
(0,19) 
   
Imports from the South (% GDP)   -0,102 
(0,33) 
-0,099 
(0,33) 
   
        
Exports to the North (% GO in man.)     0,204*** 
(0,04) 
0,354*** 
(0,05) 
0,061** 
(0,02) 
Imports from the North (% GO in man.)     -0,272*** 
(0,06) 
-0,487*** 
(0,08) 
-0,095*** 
(0,03) 
Exports to the South (% GO in man.)     0,288*** 
(0,12) 
0,407*** 
(0,12) 
0,205*** 
(0,07) 
Imports from the South (% GO in man.)     -0,874*** 
(0,15) 
-1,234*** 
(0,15) 
-0,329*** 
(0,11) 
        
Inward FDI    0,0002 
(0,00) 
 0,0004 
(0,00) 
 
Outward FDI    -0,0001 
(0,00) 
 -0,0001 
(0,00) 
 
        
Unemployment -0.012 
(0.01) 
-0,012 
(0,01) 
-0,014* 
(0,008) 
-0,015* 
(0,007) 
-0,017** 
(0,007) 
-0,017** 
(0,007) 
 
Gross fixed Capital Formation -0,021 
(0.02) 
-0,022 
(0,02) 
0,002 
(0,02) 
0,008 
(0,02) 
0,065*** 
(0,02) 
0,106*** 
(0,02) 
 
Labor maket participation of women -0,129*** 
(0,04) 
-0,133*** 
(0,04) 
-0,197*** 
(0,04) 
-0,176*** 
(0,04) 
-0,154*** 
(0,04) 
-0,191*** 
(0,04) 
-0,043** 
(0,02) 
        
Observations 540 540 540 480 540 480 522 
 
                          Note. – Numbers in parentheses are SEs. Controls for fixed effects and period effects are included in all models. * P < .1; ** P < .05; *** P < 0.0
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Using the regression coefficients from model 5 along with the actual data, we reproduce the exercise 
proposed by Kollmeyer (2009) in order to quantify the relative importance of trade in manufactures as 
a key factor contributing to deindustrialization in advanced countries. The results are shown in table 4 
below. Based on our calculations, global trade affected negatively relative manufacturing employment 
in virtually all countries, with the exceptions of Ireland and Austria, over the period 1977-2007. While 
the direct contribution of trade in manufactures to deindustrialization seems to be relatively small for 
countries like Sweden (0.3%), Finland (5.8%) or Germany (9%), it is contrastingly large for countries like 
the US (30.2%), the UK (34.4%), Australia (39.9%) or Greece (41.6%). It is noteworthy that the evolution 
of North-South trade has contributed negatively to relative manufacturing employment in all selected 
advanced countries. The view is more nuanced for North-North trade, as it has contributed negatively 
to relative manufacturing employment in countries like Austria, Germany and Netherlands, while it has 
speeded up deindustrialization in countries like France, Portugal and Spain. Generally speaking, our 
estimates exceed those of Kollmeyer (2009:1666) for the Group of Seven (G-7) countries. While they 
do not contradict the widespread belief that ‘internal’ factors are more important in accounting for 
deindustrialization in advanced countries taken as whole, they indicate that trade may have played an 
important role in relative manufacturing decline in a number of countries, especially as trade has also 
affected indirectly relative manufacturing employment by enhancing the growth of income (GDP per 
capita) and relative labor productivity in the manufacturing sector. The impact of trade may also have 
to be revised upwards taking into account the FDI flows in manufacturing and the offshoring of certain 
services that were previously performed domestically in the manufacturing firms.  
 
Table 4: Direct Contribution of Trade to Deindustrialization for 18 OECD Countries, 1977-2007  
 
  Attributable % of Change 
 
Percentage-Point Drop in  
relative manufacturing  
employment, 1977-2007 
North-North  
Trade 
North-South 
Trade 
Trade 
Australia -11,0 8,0 31,9 39,9 
Austria -9,6 -8,8 8,7 -0,1 
Canada -7,3 -3,9 25,8 21,9 
Denmark -7,1 0,3 14,0 14,3 
Finland -5,2 -3,9 9,7 5,8 
France -9,4 6,4 10,6 17,0 
Germany -10,8 -5,2 14,3 9,0 
Greece -8,1 14,8 26,8 41,6 
Ireland -7,3 -40,6 15,2 -25,3 
Italy -9,4 4,0 10,4 14,4 
Japan -4,8 -0,1 13,4 13,2 
Netherlands -9,5 -15,0 29,9 14,9 
Norway -8,1 -1,3 14,8 13,5 
Portugal -4,5 20,0 7,5 27,5 
Spain -7,9 13,2 19,4 32,6 
Sweden  -7,2 -4,0 4,4 0,3 
United Kingdom -17,4 8,2 26,2 34,4 
United States -10,1 4,5 25,6 30,2      
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Model 7 in table 3 shows the results from our dynamic LDV model. When one lag of the dependent 
variable is included as an explanatory variable into the regression, the labor market participation rate 
of women is the only control variable that remains significant. The two other control variables, namely 
the unemployment rate and the intensity of gross fixed capital formation, are therefore removed from 
the regression. As it might be expected, the sectoral structure of employment evolves relatively slowly 
over time. The autoregressive coefficient is indeed equal to 0.79, which implies a relatively low speed 
of adjustment. All the variables of interest remain significant, but the magnitude of the coefficients 
and standard errors is substantially lowered. If such a result could raise concern about the validity of 
the dynamic specification in the presence of unaddressed serial autocorrelation (see Achen, 2001), it 
rather seems to be suggesting here that it will take time for the system to fully adjust to variations in 
the explanatory variables. Interestingly, the inclusion of the time dummies seems to be less important 
in the dynamic specification. With the exception of a few years, the time dummies are not significant 
at the conventional levels of significance. This result does not give strong support to the assumption 
formulated by Kollmeyer (2009) that the high significance of the time dummies in the static regressions 
could be due to hardly measurable outsourcing of activities once performed by manufacturing firms 
themselves, but rather tends to attribute this statistical finding to the absence or lack of dynamics in 
the models.  
 
6. The macroeconomic consequences of deindustrialization 
 
The process of deindustrialization has commonly been associated with relative economic decline in 
advanced economies. The literature is full of examples of regions or cities where deindustrialization, 
characterized by massive shutdown and job losses in the manufacturing sector, has coincided with a 
period of socioeconomic dislocation. In line with these deindustrialization stories, a large number of 
scholars have emphasized the ‘socioeconomic costs’ supposedly implied by the phenomenon. These 
costs can take a myriad of forms. Deindustrialization has thus been blamed, among others, for rising 
unemployment and poverty in a number of older industrial regions, which in turn has been translated 
into higher economic inequality (see e.g. Doussard et al., 2009), lower individual economic aspirations, 
motivations and expectations (see e.g. Beck, 2000; Meyer, 2009; Sissons, 2009; compare Ackers, 2014), 
lower ability to finance public education (see e.g. Spayd and Dye, 1991; Bettis, 1994), poorer health 
conditions (see e.g. Renner and Navarro, 1989; Wallace D. and Wallace R., 1999; Ostry et al., 2002; EIR, 
2006; Holland et al., 2011), higher violence (see e.g. Ousey, 2000; Matthews et al., 2001), and higher 
rates of both suicide (see e.g. Kubrin et al., 2006) and mortality (see e.g. EIR, 2006; Hanlon et al., 2010). 
While deindustrialization can truly have some devastating socioeconomic effects on local communities 
in the regions that are especially affected by the erosion of manufacturing employment, it is incredibly 
hard to assess the aggregated impact of deindustrialization at national level, as economic restructuring 
involves a number of redistributive effects. By way of illustration, trade-led deindustrialization may be 
totally or partially offset by the fast growth of tradeable services resulting from specialization patterns 
driven by comparative advantage. In the same vein, technology-led deindustrialization takes place as 
part of a process of ‘creative destruction’ - as Schumpeter (1942) called it - rewarding the successful 
innovators and destroying old sources of competitive advantage, those exploited by the operators of 
the incumbent technologies. Thus, despite a severe economic downturn in older industrial cities of the 
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New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest regions of the USA, which was supposedly due to the collapse 
of their manufacturing sectors, Reardon (2005) notices that the period between 1970 and 1990 was, 
with the exception of a few years, a time of significant and sustained growth in the US economy as a 
whole. Focusing on the British economy, other scholars have contrastingly blamed deindustrialization 
for inferior growth and productivity improvement during the postwar period (see e.g. Kitson and 
Michie, 1996, 1997 and 2014). In line with this view, the alarming hypothesis of deindustrialization as 
the main factor responsible for current slow economic growth in advanced countries, which some 
economists believe to be the onset of a ‘secular stagnation’, has also gained in popularity in recent 
years as the share of manufacturing in total workforce is reaching lower and lower levels. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of deindustrialization on growth critically depdends on 
whether or not growth is ‘sector-indifferent’. Distinguishing between the concepts of ‘activity’ and 
‘sector’, Palma (2014) has recently proposed to classify growth theories into three camps. The first 
camp includes the theories that view growth as both ‘sector-indifferent’ and ‘activity-indifferent’. 
Examples are Solow-type models and the branch of endogenous theories that associates growth with 
increasing returns which are activity-indifferent, i.e. not based on the use of R&D or the production of 
human capital. The second camp argues that growth is ‘sector-indifferent’ but ‘activity-specific’. In 
these growth models, like Romer’s work and neo-Schumpeterian models, increasing returns, though 
generated by R&D activities, are explicitly not associated with manufacturing activities as such. The 
third camp gathers the theories regarding growth as both ‘sector-specific’ and ‘activity-specific’. In 
these growth theories, including mainly Post-Keynesian, Schumpeterian and structuralist theories, the 
pattern and dynamic of growth are crucially dependent on the activities being developed, with the 
latter being specific to the nature of the sector involved, thus opening ways for Kaldorian-style effects 
concerning investment embedding or embodying technological change. As noted by Palma (2014:21), 
“the crucial difference between this camp and the previous two ones is that issues such as technological 
change, externalities, synergies, balance-of-payments sustainability, and the capacity of developing 
countries to ‘catch up’, are in fact directly linked to the size, strength and depth of the manufacturing 
sector”.  
 
Generally speaking, any multi-sector model’s predictions of the long-run growth consequences of 
deindustrialization depends on its ability to generate structural change, including deindustrialization, 
along a balanced growth path (BGP). If this is the case, structural change is arguably viewed as growth-
neutral. If this not the case, deindustrialization is then usually viewed as economically harmful because 
the manufacturing sector is usually believed to exhibit higher potential for technological (productivity) 
advance. Thus, while the theoretical multi-sector models proposed by Baumol (1967) and Acemoglu 
and Guerrieri (2008) predict unbalanced growth, with the long-run growth rate of the economy being 
determined by the asymptotically dominant sector, the services sector and the labor-intensive sector 
respectively, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) construct a multi-sector model of growth in which structural 
change takes place along a balanced growth path. A number of emprirical studies have been devoted 
to quantifying the effect of deindustrialization on (productivity) growth. Such an exercise can be done 
in a variety of ways, ranging from the use of growth accounting techniques, like the canonical shift-
share method, to econometric analysis. As recently pointed out by Tregenna (2015:34), this empirical 
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literature53 is however inconclusive: “The empirical evidence is mixed. A positive relationship between 
manufacturing and growth is found in several studies, but there is large variation in this relationship, 
including for different periods of time.” While acknowledging the unclearness of the empirical results, 
Tregenna (2015) argues that the likely growth effects of deindustrialization should depdend inter alia 
on the level of income per capita and the degree of industrialization at which deindustrialization starts; 
on the nature of deindustrialization, including both its causes and its dynamics; on the nature of the 
manufacturing activities that are in relative decline and of the activities, both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing, that are relatively growing54.  
 
Independently from the desirability of deindustrialization, whose assessment is multidimensional, the 
question of whether or not deindustrialization is avoidable has also been tackled in the literature as it 
has very important policy implications. The answer to this research question critically depends on the 
extent to which researchers are willing to acknowledge deindustrialization as an endogenous process 
progressively taking place over time with economic development and arising as an efficient equilibrium 
outcome, what economists have sometimes referred to as ‘positive deindustrialization’. While it seems 
to be increasingly accepted among the scientific community that the decline in relative manufacturing 
employment is a natural phenomenon in advanced countries, it is also widely believed that the pace 
at which deindustrialization takes place in a country is subject to policy interventions, as well as to the 
country’s position in international trade. Deindustrialization indeed occurs in an interdependent world, 
thus requiring a global analysis that should go beyond the separate study of national experiences, and 
can truly be accelerated by a policy change or more generally by the lack of support to manufacturing. 
If manufacturing is considered as having special properties as an engine of growth, then policy-induced 
or trade-driven deindustrialization that would be characterized by a large loss of industrial substance, 
measured in terms of technical know-how and innovative capacities, may be economically damaging, 
especially as there is evidence showing that deindustrialization is associated with a deterioration of 
the trade balance in a number of countries, with potential implications for the ability to finance imports 
and maintain living tandards (see e.g. Kitson and Michie, 1997; Legarda and Blazquez, 2013; McKinnon, 
2013). This is probably why many scholars have forcefully called for reindustrialization in the Western 
countries, arguing that the decline in relative manufacturing employment could be slowed down or 
even temporarily reversed with an active industrial policy that would, among others, help in exploiting 
the opportunities offererd by foreign trade, for instance through a growing specialization in high-value 
added goods or high-value added segments of increasingly global value chains, and build strong 
linkages between the manufacturing sector and other activities like services to increase the scope for 
positive externalities and interaction effects. As noted by Tregenna (2015:49), industrial policy alone 
is however not enough to strenghthen a country’s manufacturing base. To be fully effective, industrial 
policy needs to be complemented by a supportive macroeconomic policy, especially regarding the 
interest and exchange rates, and appropriate trade policy, technology policy, labour market policy and 
skills and education policies. Regarding this point, Crafts (1996) early advocated in favor of a supply-
side policy that would not place too much focus on the decline in relative manufacturing employment, 
                                                          
53 See e.g. Pieper (2000), Dasgupta and Singh (2006), Szirmai and Verspagen (2011), Szirmai (2012), and Naudé et al. (2013). 
54 By way of illustration, Stijepic and Warner (2008) show, by the use of a multisector-growth-model where the sectors differ 
by their TFP-growth, that offshoring, through generating structural transformation, influences the long run growth rate of 
the economy along different channels and that the growth effects are dependent on the evolution of terms of trade and on 
whether low-productivity-growth-activities or high-productivity-growth activities are offshored. 
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viewed as a ‘distraction’ because it is “an inherent part of a process of raising the growth rate by 
improving the appropriability of returns to innovation and liberalizing the economy” (p.181), but would 
rather address the substantial issues over the human capital formation and technical capabilities of 
manufacturing55, and over investment attractiveness, defined as a country’s ability to attract foreign 
direct investment. In Crafts’ mind, investment attractiveness is crucial to ensure that knowledge 
available from abroad will be used effectively and speedily. Labour market policy, along with education 
policy, also crucially matter as they will contribute to determining the speed of structural change and 
the ease with which labor will move from one sector to another. Thompson et al. (2012) thus argue 
that the potential gains from international trade, which induces some structural change, are directly 
linked to the degree of flexibility of the economy, especially of the labour market, thus joining many 
trade theorists’ idea that the effects of trade on unemployment highly depend on labor market 
institutions, i.e. on differences in labor market frictions across industries and countries (see e.g. Stijepic 
and Wagner, 2008; Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010; Fugazza et al., 2014)56. In line with this view, the 
decades-long contraction of the manufacturing sector has often been blamed for the persistently high 
unemployment rates observed in advanced countries since the mid-1970s (see e.g. Bluestone, 1983; 
Bonoli, 200657; Sissons, 2009; Webster, 2010; Kollmeyer, 2013). 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Deindustrialization is one of the best-established stylized facts associated with the process of economic 
development in advanced economies. Yet the causes and consequences of the phenomenon are still 
not fully understood, which contributes to feeding into scientific and political discussions, especially as 
there is a longstanding tradition in economics which argues that manufacturing industry has a critical 
role in growth (Weiss and Jalilian, 2016). This paper, which joins the debate on the causes of the decline 
in relative manufacturing employment, does not contradict the widespread belief that internal factors, 
such as economic affluence and unbalanced productivity growth, are quantitatively more important in 
explaining deindustrialization in the advanced countries taken as a whole. Nevertheless, it shows that 
globalization, through both direct and indirect effects, may have accounted for higher proportions than 
long believed in a number of countries. This result notably lies on the definition of new trade variables 
designed to capture the effects of globalization on relative manufacturing employment. Regarding this 
last point, the recent development of statistics on trade flows expressed in value added terms, as well 
as more precise data on FDI flows and offshoring, should help to enhance and refine the results in the 
future.  
 
                                                          
55 Regarding this point, Bernard et al. (2016) have recently stressed the importance of a supply-side policy that focuses not 
only on manufacturing but also on services as there esist service sector firms, notably composed of firms that once operated 
in the manufacturing sector, the so-called ‘switchers out of manufacturing’, that still perform many of the high value-added 
activities of a typical traditional manufacturing firm.  
56 See e.g. Belenkiy and Riker (2015) for a survey of the recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, linking international 
trade to unemployment rates. 
57 Bonoli (2006:3) thus argues that “current long term unemployment [in developed market economies] has essentially two 
roots: deindustrialization and the institutional rigidities in service-based labour markets”.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1: Share of Manufacturing in Total Nominal Value Added (%) 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 200758 
variation  
(1970-2007) 
Australia 24,6% 19,8% 14,5% 12,7% 10,5% -14,0% 
Austria 27,9% 23,7% 21,4% 20,3% 20,0% -7,9% 
Belgium 29,4% 23,1% 22,8% 19,3% 16,4% -13,0% 
Denmark 20,5% 18,9% 17,4% 16,2% 15,0% -5,5% 
Finland 26,2% 27,5% 22,6% 26,2% 23,6% -2,6% 
France 24,4% 21,7% 18,3% 16,0% 12,3% -12,1% 
Germany 34,9% 29,7% 28,1% 22,9% 23,6% -11,3% 
Greece 23,1% 22,2% 18,1% 12,0% 11,1% -11,9% 
Ireland 22,1% 21,6% 27,7% 33,6% 22,2% 0,2% 
Italy 27,6% 28,9% 23,3% 21,0% 19,0% -8,5% 
Japan 33,5% 27,2% 26,1% 21,3% 20,6% -12,9% 
Luxembourg 41,1% 25,4% 20,7% 11,3% 8,6% -32,5% 
Netherlands 25,3% 18,1% 18,6% 15,6% 13,7% -11,6% 
Portugal 16,8% 20,6% 19,2% 17,1% 14,4% -2,3% 
Spain 30,5% 28,1% 23,6% 18,6% 14,9% -15,6% 
Sweden 23,2% 21,7% 20,3% 22,0% 20,0% -3,2% 
United Kingdom 34,2% 26,8% 22,8% 17,3% 12,4% -21,7% 
United States 23,5% 20,8% 17,5% 15,2% 13,2% -10,4% 
EU15 26,6% 23,4% 22,6% 19,9% 18,2% -8,4% 
 
 
Table 2: Share of Manufacturing in Total Employment (%) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 
variation  
(1970-2007) 
Australia 27,0% 21,0% 15,7% 13,5% 10,9% -16,1% 
Austria 26,3% 25,0% 21,5% 16,8% 15,5% -10,8% 
Belgium 31,9% 25,5% 22,0% 17,3% 14,5% -17,4% 
Denmark 24,8% 19,7% 18,9% 17,0% 13,8% -10,9% 
Finland 21,6% 23,1% 18,9% 18,7% 16,7% -5,0% 
France 23,4% 22,1% 18,5% 15,3% 12,9% -10,6% 
Germany 33,9% 29,6% 26,7% 20,9% 19,3% -14,6% 
Greece 20,4% 23,0% 22,1% 16,2% 13,9% -6,6% 
Ireland 20,5% 21,6% 19,7% 18,3% 13,7% -6,8% 
Italy 27,4% 27,9% 23,6% 20,8% 19,2% -8,2% 
Japan 26,3% 23,5% 23,9% 20,1% 18,9% -7,5% 
Luxembourg 24,0% 24,0% 20,7% 13,2% 11,2% -12,8% 
Netherlands 24,8% 20,4% 17,8% 14,0% 12,0% -12,7% 
Portugal 22,1% 23,4% 23,2% 20,2% 17,6% -4,6% 
Spain 21,9% 22,7% 19,6% 18,2% 14,8% -7,0% 
Sweden 27,1% 23,5% 20,4% 19,6% 17,3% -9,8% 
United Kingdom 33,2% 27,5% 20,3% 16,7% 11,8% -21,4% 
United States 22,4% 19,1% 14,9% 12,7% 9,9% -12,5% 
EU15 28,3% 25,8% 22,0% 18,3% 15,6% -12,7% 
 
    Source: EUKLEMS Database 
                                                          
58 As data on employment and value added are missing for Portugal for 2007, data for Portugal are related to the year 2006. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Value Added and Employment, 1970-200759 
 Value Added Employment 
 Total Economy Manufacturing Total Economy Manufacturing 
Australia 3,3% 1,5% 1,7% -0,9% 
Austria 2,7% 3,1% 0,3% -0,8% 
Belgium 2,4% 2,7% 0,4% -1,8% 
Denmark 1,9% 1,0% 0,5% -1,3% 
Finland 2,8% 4,4% 0,3% -0,5% 
France 2,5% 1,9% 0,6% -1,3% 
Germany 2,2% 1,4% 0,5% -1,2% 
Greece 3,0% 1,4% 0,8% -0,2% 
Ireland 4,9% 7,1% 1,9% 0,6% 
Italy 2,3% 2,5% 0,6% -0,2% 
Japan 3,2% 3,9% 0,5% -0,6% 
Luxembourg 5,0% 1,8% 2,4% -0,6% 
Netherlands 2,7% 2,4% 1,2% -0,9% 
Portugal 3,2% 2,4% 0,4% -0,3% 
Spain 3,1% 2,8% 1,4% 0,3% 
Sweden 2,3% 3,2% 0,3% -1,2% 
United Kingdom 2,1% 0,6% 0,4% -2,5% 
United States 2,9% 2,8% 1,6% -0,7% 
EU15 2,5% 1,9% 0,6% -1,0% 
 
  Source: EUKLEMS Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 As data on employment and value added are missing for Portugal for 2007, the period covered for Portufal is 1970-2006. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of Real Value Added, 1970-2007 
 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-200760 
 
Economy Manufact. Economy Manufact. Economy Manufact. Economy Manufact. 
Australia 3,0% 1,5% 3,3% 1,2% 3,6% 1,8% 3,2% 1,6% 
Austria 3,7% 3,6% 2,2% 2,5% 2,6% 2,8% 2,1% 3,5% 
Belgium 3,6% 4,5% 2,0% 3,4% 2,0% 1,4% 1,9% 1,0% 
Denmark 2,1% 1,6% 1,9% 0,4% 2,3% 1,2% 1,3% 0,6% 
Finland 3,5% 3,8% 3,0% 3,6% 2,0% 5,0% 2,9% 5,5% 
France 3,5% 3,5% 2,4% 0,7% 1,9% 2,3% 1,8% 0,8% 
Germany 2,8% 1,9% 2,3% 1,6% 2,0% 0,2% 1,4% 2,0% 
Greece 5,0% 5,9% 1,4% -0,5% 2,0% -0,9% 3,8% 0,9% 
Ireland 4,0% 4,5% 3,6% 8,0% 6,7% 10,2% 5,6% 5,0% 
Italy 3,8% 6,1% 2,4% 2,1% 1,5% 1,1% 1,2% 0,1% 
Japan 5,1% 5,5% 4,6% 6,1% 1,4% 1,1% 1,3% 2,4% 
Luxembourg 3,3% -1,6% 7,2% 5,5% 5,0% 2,7% 4,3% 0,1% 
Netherlands 3,5% 2,9% 2,3% 2,5% 3,0% 2,6% 1,9% 1,4% 
Portugal 5,0% 5,5% 3,0% 1,6% 2,7% 1,6% 1,1% 0,2% 
Spain 3,5% 4,6% 2,9% 2,7% 2,8% 2,1% 3,3% 1,3% 
Sweden 2,3% 1,5% 2,3% 1,9% 2,1% 5,1% 2,8% 4,5% 
United Kingdom 1,0% -0,6% 2,5% 2,0% 2,5% 0,6% 2,4% 0,5% 
United States 2,7% 2,2% 3,1% 2,9% 3,2% 4,1% 2,3% 1,6% 
EU15 2,9% 2,6% 2,5% 1,9% 2,2% 1,4% 2,1% 1,4% 
 
 
Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rate of Employment, 1970-2007 
 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2007 
 Economy Manufact. Economy Manufact. Economy Manufact. Economy Manufact. 
Australia 1,4% -1,2% 1,8% -1,4% 1,5% -0,3% 2,3% -0,8% 
Austria -0,1% 0,1% 0,2% -1,3% 0,6% -1,3% 0,6% -0,4% 
Belgium 0,2% -2,2% 0,2% -1,6% 0,6% -1,6% 0,9% -1,5% 
Denmark 0,4% -2,0% 0,4% -0,2% 0,4% -1,2% 0,7% -1,7% 
Finland 0,4% 1,1% 0,5% -1,4% -0,8% -0,9% 1,2% -0,7% 
France 0,6% -0,3% 0,3% -1,8% 0,6% -1,4% 0,8% -1,6% 
Germany 0,3% -1,1% 1,0% 0,0% 0,4% -2,5% 0,2% -1,0% 
Greece 1,0% 2,3% 0,9% 0,5% 0,5% -2,5% 1,0% -1,3% 
Ireland 1,0% 1,3% 0,3% -0,9% 3,4% 2,4% 3,3% -1,1% 
Italy 0,7% 1,2% 0,6% -1,1% 0,1% -1,1% 1,3% 0,2% 
Japan 0,8% -0,3% 0,9% 0,9% 0,2% -1,8% -0,2% -1,5% 
Luxembourg 1,3% -1,0% 1,7% -0,8% 3,4% -1,1% 3,4% 0,9% 
Netherlands 0,6% -1,4% 1,5% -0,2% 1,9% -0,6% 0,9% -1,7% 
Portugal 1,6% 2,2% -1,0% -1,2% 0,6% -0,8% 0,3% -2,0% 
Spain 0,0% 0,4% 1,1% -0,5% 1,7% 0,9% 3,3% 0,6% 
Sweden 0,9% -0,8% 0,5% -1,0% -0,7% -1,6% 0,7% -1,4% 
United Kingdom 0,3% -1,8% 0,4% -2,8% 0,3% -1,8% 0,9% -3,9% 
United States 2,1% 0,5% 1,8% -0,5% 1,5% -0,1% 0,6% -3,6% 
EU15 0,5% -0,5% 0,6% -1,1% 0,6% -1,5% 1,0% -1,2% 
 
 Source: EUKLEMS Database 
                                                          
60 As data on employment and value added are missing for Portugal for 2007, the period covered for Portufal is 2000-2006. 
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Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of Labor Productivity and Prices, 1970-200761 
 Labor Productivity Prices 
 Manufacturing Services Differential Manufacturing Services Differential 
Australia 2,4% 1,3% 1,1% 5,4% 6,1% -0,8% 
Austria 4,3% 1,6% 2,8% 2,1% 4,0% -1,9% 
Belgium 4,9% 1,7% 3,2% 2,1% 4,8% -2,7% 
Canada 2,6% 1,1% 1,5% 4,0% 4,7% -0,7% 
Denmark 2,5% 1,4% 1,1% 5,3% 5,2% 0,0% 
Finland 5,3% 1,6% 3,7% 3,8% 6,4% -2,6% 
France 3,7% 1,8% 1,9% 3,8% 5,5% -1,8% 
Germany 3,2% 2,2% 1,1% 2,5% 2,9% -0,4% 
Greece 1,4% 1,0% 0,5% 11,0% 11,5% -0,5% 
Ireland 6,7% 1,9% 4,8% 5,3% 8,7% -3,4% 
Italy 2,9% 0,5% 2,4% 6,9% 8,8% -2,0% 
Japan 4,9% 2,7% 2,2% 0,2% 2,6% -2,4% 
Luxembourg 1,6% 3,7% -2,2% 2,7% 4,1% -1,4% 
Netherlands 3,9% 1,8% 2,1% 2,0% 3,8% -1,8% 
Norway 2,1% 2,2% -0,1% 5,9% 5,1% 0,8% 
Portugal 3,1% 2,8% 0,3% 10,3% 9,9% 0,4% 
Spain 2,9% 1,0% 1,9% 6,5% 9,1% -2,7% 
Sweden 4,0% 1,1% 2,9% 4,3% 6,0% -1,8% 
United Kingdom 3,2% 1,4% 1,8% 5,6% 7,4% -1,8% 
United States 3,5% 1,0% 2,5% 2,6% 4,5% -1,8% 
EU15 3,3% 1,5% 1,7% 2,2% 2,9% -0,7% 
 
    Source: EUKlems Database, STAN Database (OCDE)62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 As data on employment and value added are missing for Portugal for 2007, the period covered for Portufal is 1970-2006 
62 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
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Table 1: Share of Finance, Real Estate and PBS in Total Employment, 197063 and 200764 
 
Share of total employment  
in 1970 (%) 
Share of total employment  
in 2007 (%) 
Australia 6,5% 16,5% 
Austria 4,6% 15,9% 
Belgium 6,6% 20,4% 
Canada 7,0% 17,8% 
Denmark 6,7% 15,9% 
Finland 3,6% 12,7% 
France 7,6% 18,5% 
Germany 5,7% 17,2% 
Greece 3,6% 10,1% 
Ireland 3,4% 13,9% 
Italy 2,9% 14,2% 
Japan 5,0% 14,7% 
Luxembourg 11,4% 27,6% 
Netherlands 9,0% 22,2% 
Norway 4,3% 14,0% 
Portugal 2,9% 7,4% 
Spain 3,4% 11,4% 
Sweden 5,1% 14,5% 
United Kingdom 8,1% 22,3% 
United States 10,6% 19,6% 
EU15 5,8% 16,6% 
                                       
Table 2: Evolution of Employment in Total Economy and Finance, Real Estate and PBS, 1970-200765 
 Total Economy Finance, Real Estate and PBS 
 
Growth Rate of  
Employment,  
1970-2007 (%) 
Average Annual  
Growth Rate of  
Employment,  
1970-2007 (%) 
Growth Rate of  
Employment,  
1970-2007 (%) 
Average Annual  
Growth Rate of  
Employment, 
1970-2007 (%) 
Contribution to  
Employment Growth 
of Total Economy,  
1970-2007 (%)  
Australia 77,4% 1,6% 348,3% 4,1% 22,7% 
Austria 5,7% 0,1% 261,5% 3,5% 12,1% 
Belgium -3,7% -0,1% 196,6% 3,0% 13,0% 
Canada 86,7% 1,7% 376,9% 4,3% 26,3% 
Denmark -0,5% 0,0% 137,6% 2,4% 9,2% 
Finland -5,8% -0,2% 232,3% 3,3% 8,4% 
France -7,0% -0,2% 127,7% 2,2% 9,7% 
Germany -12,2% -0,4% 162,3% 2,6% 9,3% 
Greece 42,6% 1,0% 294,8% 3,8% 10,7% 
Ireland 70,1% 1,4% 587,7% 5,3% 20,2% 
Italy 25,0% 0,6% 513,9% 5,0% 14,8% 
Japan -3,0% -0,1% 182,3% 2,9% 9,2% 
Luxembourg 133,7% 2,3% 464,4% 4,8% 53,0% 
Netherlands 19,8% 0,5% 196,9% 3,0% 17,6% 
Norway 19,5% 0,5% 285,4% 3,7% 12,4% 
Portugal -0,7% 0,0% 153,5% 2,6% 4,5% 
Spain 43,1% 1,0% 385,2% 4,4% 12,9% 
Sweden 15,4% 0,4% 225,5% 3,2% 11,6% 
United Kingdom 6,8% 0,2% 195,0% 3,0% 15,8% 
United States 53,0% 1,4% 181,9% 3,5% 19,4% 
EU15 7,0% 0,2% 209,1% 3,1% 12,0% 
 
Source: EUKlems Database, STAN Database (OCDE)66 
                                                          
63 As data is missing for the US before 1977, data for the US is related to the year 1977.  
64 As data is missing for Portugal for the year 2007, data for Portugal is related to the year 2006. 
65 The period covered for the US is 1977-2007. The period covered for Portugal is 1970-2006. 
66 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Table 1: Share of Professional and Business Services (PBS) in Total Employment, 197067 and 200768 
 
Share of  
total employment  
in 1970 (%) 
Share of  
total employment  
in 2007 (%) 
Australia 3,2% 10,9% 
Austria 2,2% 11,7% 
Belgium 3,6% 16,6% 
Denmark 3,7% 11,4% 
Finland 1,4% 9,5% 
France 5,0% 14,4% 
Germany 3,0% 12,9% 
Greece 2,6% 7,4% 
Ireland 2,0% 8,5% 
Italy 1,7% 11,6% 
Japan 2,2% 10,5% 
Luxembourg 4,2% 15,0% 
Netherlands 5,7% 17,6% 
Norway 2,3% 10,5% 
Portugal 0,8% 5,6% 
Spain 1,6% 8,2% 
Sweden 3,1% 10,7% 
United Kingdom 5,3% 16,8% 
United States 5,6% 13,8% 
EU15 3,4% 12,7% 
 
Table 2: Evolution of Employment in Professional and Business Services (PBS), 1970-200769 
 Total Economy PBS 
 
Growth Rate of  
Employment,  
1970-2007 (%) 
Average Annual  
Growth Rate of  
Employment,  
1970-2007 (%) 
Growth Rate of  
Employment,  
1970-2007 (%) 
Average Annual  
Growth Rate of  
Employment, 
1970-2007 (%) 
Contribution to  
Employment Growth 
of Total Economy,  
1970-2007 (%)  
Australia 77,4% 1,6% 496,2% 4,9% 16,1% 
Austria 5,7% 0,1% 467,0% 4,8% 10,2% 
Belgium -3,7% -0,1% 342,8% 4,1% 12,4% 
Denmark -0,5% 0,0% 211,3% 3,1% 7,7% 
Finland -5,8% -0,2% 564,5% 5,3% 7,6% 
France -7,0% -0,2% 168,0% 2,7% 8,4% 
Germany -12,2% -0,4% 271,8% 3,6% 8,3% 
Greece 42,6% 1,0% 315,1% 3,9% 8,1% 
Ireland 70,1% 1,4% 608,1% 5,4% 12,3% 
Italy 25,0% 0,6% 762,5% 6,0% 12,8% 
Japan -3,0% -0,1% 350,9% 4,3% 7,9% 
Luxembourg 133,7% 2,3% 741,2% 5,9% 30,9% 
Netherlands 19,8% 0,5% 267,5% 3,6% 15,3% 
Norway 19,5% 0,5% 455,6% 4,7% 10,3% 
Portugal -0,7% 0,0% 567,0% 5,4% 4,7% 
Spain 43,1% 1,0% 625,7% 5,5% 10,2% 
Sweden 15,4% 0,4% 302,8% 3,8% 9,3% 
United Kingdom 6,8% 0,2% 235,2% 3,3% 12,6% 
United States 53,0% 1,4% 274,8% 4,5% 15,4% 
EU15 7,0% 0,2% 296,9% 3,8% 10,1% 
 
Source: EUKlems Database, STAN Database (OCDE)70 
                                                          
67 As data is missing for the US before 1977, data for the US is related to the year 1977.  
68 As data is missing for Portugal for the year 2007, data for Portugal is related to the year 2006. 
69 The period covered for the US is 1977-2007. The period covered for Portugal is 1970-2006. 
70 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
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Table 1: Ratio of Intermediate Consumption over Gross Output in Manufacturing 
 197071 1980 1990 2000 200772 
Australia 0,62 0,67 0,65 0,70 0,71 
Austria 0,65 0,65 0,64 0,64 0,68 
Belgium 0,68 0,71 0,70 0,75 0,80 
Canada 0,64 0,69 0,66 0,68 0,70 
Denmark 0,66 0,68 0,66 0,65 0,67 
Finland 0,67 0,69 0,66 0,70 0,71 
France 0,70 0,71 0,70 0,73 0,76 
Germany 0,61 0,64 0,62 0,67 0,69 
Greece 0,63 0,64 0,65 0,67 0,65 
Ireland 0,65 0,65 0,65 0,68 0,67 
Italy 0,63 0,67 0,67 0,72 0,74 
Japan 0,68 0,71 0,66 0,64 0,68 
Luxembourg 0,68 0,68 0,64 0,68 0,73 
Netherlands 0,68 0,74 0,71 0,73 0,75 
Norway 0,68 0,72 0,73 0,71 0,74 
Portugal 0,74 0,76 0,77 0,73 0,75 
Spain 0,70 0,70 0,69 0,72 0,74 
Sweden 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,69 0,72 
United Kingdom 0,67 0,70 0,62 0,65 0,67 
United States 0,66 0,68 0,65 0,64 0,66 
EU15 0,64 0,67 0,66 0,69 0,72 
 
              Source: EUKlems Database, STAN Database (OCDE)73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
71 As data is missing for the US before 1977, data for the US is related to the year 1977.  
72 As data is missing for Portugal for the year 2007, data for Portugal is related to the year 2006. 
73 Data for Canada and Norway are from the STAN Database. For the other countries, data are from the EU Klems Database. 
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Table 1: share of imports in domestic final demand for manufactures 
 1995 2007 2011 
Australia 31,1% 47,0% 47,5% 
Austria 46,5% 67,5% 68,1% 
Belgium 72,0% 79,4% 83,4% 
Denmark 67,8% 80,8% 84,4% 
Finland 38,7% 54,2% 52,2% 
France 36,6% 47,6% 48,2% 
Germany 30,8% 48,3% 49,7% 
Greece 32,8% 49,8% 45,4% 
Ireland 68,9% 73,9% 58,8% 
Italy 25,0% 35,1% 36,4% 
Japan 12,1% 23,0% 22,6% 
Luxembourg 88,8% 91,0% 93,4% 
Netherlands 63,7% 71,8% 77,6% 
Portugal 40,2% 56,5% 52,1% 
Spain 28,9% 50,9% 47,3% 
Sweden 48,5% 57,9% 59,3% 
United Kingdom 39,7% 57,4% 62,8% 
United States 25,1% 33,4% 34,1% 
 
                                           Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
